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Abstract
A reoccurring problem with software security is that programmers are encouraged to rea-
son about correctness either at code-level or at the design level, while attacks often tend
to take places on intermediary layers of abstraction. It may happen that the code itself
may seem correct and secure as long as its functionality has been demonstrated - for ex-
ample, by showing that some invariant has been maintained. However, from a high-level
perspective, one can observe that parallel executing processes can be seen as one single
large program consisting of smaller components that work together in order to accomplish
a task and that, for the duration of that interaction, several smaller invariants have to be
maintained. It is frequently the case that an attacker manages to subvert the behavior of
a program in case the invariants for intermediary steps can be invalidated. Such invari-
ants become difficult to track, especially when the programmer does not explicitly have
security in mind. This thesis explores the mechanisms of concurrent interaction between
concurrent processes and tries to bring some order to synchronization by studying attack
patterns, not only at code level, but also from the perspective of abstract programming
concepts.

“I had been hungry all the years-
My noon had come, to dine-
I, trembling, drew the table near
And touched the curious wine.”
I Had Been Hungry All the Years - Emily Dickinson
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
When dealing with security in a concurrent context, one expects heavyweight designs
based on intricate forms of inter-process communication (IPC). Looking at mutual ex-
clusion locks (mutexes), semaphores, resource locks and shared memory, all of them are
elaborate designs of IPC which are created with the purpose of passing data rather than
providing a simple means of synchronization. Depending on the complexity of the informa-
tion to be exchanged, programmers have to deal with unpredictable events that could pose
a security risk. It is easy, albeit tedious, to perform a static analysis of non-asynchronous
programs but considerably more difficult to reason about security and code safety in a
concurrent context. One outstanding conclusion that we are able to draw is that the
more interleaved processes are, the more likely it is to come across some unpredictable
events. To avoid unpredictable events, the most trivial solution would be to minimize
the interaction between processes. There are several ways to do that, for example, one
could minimize the number of instances where processes are meant to communicate or
one could minimize the amount of exchanged data. In the numerous case-examples we
have gathered during this thesis, it is interesting to observe that vulnerabilities are more
frequently based on abstract, low-level concepts that would require a redesign of the pro-
grams involved. In order to build a taxonomy for concurrency-based attacks, we had to
investigate intermediary design levels of programs in order to find universal patterns that
can be applied to a wide palette of attacks.
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This has lead us to UNIX systems and to explore signals and signal handlers in order
to gain insight on how IPC was historically reasoned about. We found that signals are a
lightweight mechanism that allows us to pass short messages between processes in order
to notify a process that a certain event has occurred. In order to do that, a process
installs a handler and waits for a signal to be delivered. When the signal is processed,
the execution of the main thread stops and the signal handler runs. There are a number
of signal identifiers for every type of signal that a process can send or receive. When
a process receives a signal, execution stops and the process is instructed to execute the
commands within the signal handler block. The signal handler does not run concurrently
with the main thread but the main thread can be interrupted at any time so that the
handler may run. After the execution of the signal handler control flow returns to the
place where the signal was originally delivered to the process. Signals and signal handler
mechanisms are particularly interesting because a program can be interrupted at any point
which puts a lot of pressure on a programmer to make sure that the program is ready to
be interrupted. We have seen an impressive amount of attacks which are based on the
fact that an interruption of a program at an inappropriate time can be abused at the level
of control flow so that execution is diverged to a state that is favorable to an attacker.
There are several concepts that are centered around interruptions that have strong ties
to fundamental security concepts such as denial of service attacks, time-of-check-to-time-
of-use (TOCTTOU), privilege escalations and even arbitrary execution. The most severe
cases, we have found, appear after a staging attack that is based on diverging control flow
at an inappropriate time.
While studying signals, we have determined that the connections between signal-based
attacks are subtle. For example, a signal can be received at any time after the process
has bound the signal identifier to a signal handler. From the perspective of control flow,
this leads to the interleaving between the signaling process and the process waiting for
the signal to be delivered. We can identify another subtle layer of concurrent interleaving
that takes place within the same process. Due to the fact that an interruption may occur
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at an inappropriate time, if the program is not carefully designed to handle the interrupt,
then some part of state may become corrupted. It is difficult to reason about concurrent
processes and this research has focused on concurrency by studying the interaction of
processes at the level of flow control. Various tools are used, such as the notion of
traces, rely and guarantee-logic and stability. We use traces extensively in order to reason
about the interleaving of processes with the hope that some bad behavior, due to the
concurrent interleaving of processes, may be factored out, while having in mind to not
violate too many dependencies. Rely and guarantee is used, which allows us to specify
sets of restrictions that we can bind to the traces involved in the interleaving. This
coupling of traces and rely and guarantee allows us to reason about exploits and provides
a separate specification, for each case, which we later generalize and provide a template
so that security flaws can be avoided in the future.
1.1 Motivation
Going further we have noticed that some signals implementations provide a flag that
allows a programmer to make a signal handlers run only once, which we name one-shot
signal handlers. If the signal handler is declared to be a one-shot signal handler then it can
run only once so that a second pass through the signal handler is not possible. There are
a certain similarities between one-shot signal handlers and exceptions mainly due to the
fact that they can both be used to discard entire blocks of operations that are designed to
run only once. A typical example of such operations, would be a cleanup functions that
contains asynchronous unsafe functions. A function that de-allocates memory is not safe
to be called more than once because a subsequent call would attempt to release the same
resources a second time. These functions are tagged as being non-reentrant, meaning that
a subsequent call should not be attempted.
Our research was motivated by an attack published by Zalewski[89] in Phrack, as a
case study on the Sendmail daemon. Zalewski provides several examples of non re-entrant
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safe functions and illustrates how a process may be interrupted by delivering a signal at
an inappropriate time. This is a solid example where a one-shot signal handler could be
put to use. In order to eliminate these commands we reason about control flow using
traces [23] and identify the dependencies between the program and the environment. If
it is the case that factoring out certain commands eliminates some unwanted behavior,
and if that change does not alter the meaning of the program too much, then they may
be removed in order to fix a design flaw.
We have noticed that reasoning with traces is applicable to other attacks, not necessar-
ily related to signals. For example, Watson [83] describes an exploit on a shared-memory
segment that can be reasoned about elegantly by making use of traces and stability. As
Watson’s paper describes the attack, a memory buffer is overwritten by an attacker be-
tween the time of check and the time of use. This leads us further to rely-guarantee logic
which allows us to define a set of conditions that a well-behaved program will have to
respect in order to be considered safe. In Watson’s case we can impose a restriction on the
shared-memory segment so that predicates are not abused between the time of check and
the time of use. This makes sure that the address is not overwritten due to an interfering
attacker. In doing so, we introduce the concept of stability which allows us to define what
must not change between the states of a program.
We use Aczel traces from de Roever et al. [23] which allows us to observe the concurrent
interleaving of programs as a sequence of traces where each program or thread contributes
with one or more commands. From a control-flow perspective, the composition of traces
merges programs together so that every postcondition can be seen as the result of the
individual contribution of each implicated thread. In that sense, two different programs
that depend on each other may appear as one single program to an external observer
from the perspective of control flow. The Aczel trace model describes a tuple consisting
of two states, a begin-state and an ending state as well as a process identifier that marks
processes that a particular trace belongs to. The original Aczel model contained a process
identifier that is part of a trace and allows every process to be tracked at every single
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state-change. We have removed the process identifier because it does not tell us too much
about the interaction between processes when applying the model to security. This is
mainly due to the fact that security flaws usually involve a limited amount of participants
so that determining which process is the culprit becomes trivial. We are also to specify
conditions that traces that restrict certain actions during a transition from a precondition
to a postcondition. A trace relies on some environmental condition, for example a thread
could depend on the fact that some shared resource is accessible. A trace also offers
its own set of guarantees to the environment which makes sure that it does not violate
the dependencies other processes may have. A mutual relationship is established, each
trace offering a set of guarantees to the environment and in-turn each trace relies on
the environment. Although this would appear as circular reasoning, that is not the case
because the traces do not guarantee, respectively rely on the same set of conditions. The
relationship can be seen as an agreement between processes where each involved process
relies on something that it needs from the environment and additionally offers something
different in return.
Trace compositions, predicates and stability allows us to model the interleaving be-
tween parallel processes by specifying sets of relies and guarantees that give us an overview
of control flow. This allows us to classify attacks and build a taxonomy based on similar-
ities between vulnerabilities.
Initially this research began by studying separation logic [10] in order to reason about
memory vulnerabilities where the heap must be split up. For the taxonomy though, we
have used regular disjunctions to separate predicates. As further work, traces allow us
to extend the logic and combine rely and guarantee with separation logic [80]. For the
purpose of building a taxonomy, we have been more interested about reasoning using
traces and studying programs from the perspective of control flow.
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1.2 Overview
We first offer an overview of the various tools that have been used for security and describe
the concepts behind them. This part is covered in the literature overview in the “Research
Context” and “Secure Languages and Tools” . In the “Flavors of Logic” chapter, we
revise the various flavors of logic that offer insight on how to deal with concurrency where
security and program safety is cucial.
In the “Signals and Events”, we describe the implementation of signals and observe
that a split between one-shot and persistent signal handlers is available in the implemen-
tation. Based on these functions, we then explain in detail how the signaling mechanism
is designed.
The centerpiece of the thesis consists of a taxonomy, in the “A Taxonomy on Layers
of Abstraction” chapter, that summarizes all the literature overview and offers taxonomy
trees that allow us to classify vulnerabilities using shared properties. We expand the
concept of traces and use swimlane diagrams to depict traces pictorially, thereby offering
a graphical overview of control flow. We reason about vulnerabilities but we also show
measures that could be taken in order to prevent attacks that follow similar and related
attack patterns.
Additionally, since we classify Denial of Service (DoS) as a self-standing taxonomy tree,
we identify three types of classic DoS attacks that abuse programs in different ways. We
use automata to describe the attacks and make the connection with swimlane diagrams
that we mention in the former chapters on taxonomies.
The last chapter contains conclusions and further directions that could be followed in
order to expand the taxonomy that we provide to a broader palette of attacks.
1.3 Research Context
The problem with signals is that there is no theoretical framework built that would clarify
in what particular scenarios they are meant to be used. We noticed that system daemons
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were the main software packages that made use of signals and signal handlers. We turned
to programming language design to explore the security implications that signals could
have.
In order to study concurrency in a security context, we have gathered exploits that
target programming oversights. An exploit can be described as taking advantage of a
vulnerable software package. The usual intention of an exploit is to gain access to a
system, or disrupt a service so that it is rendered unusable. The vulnerabilities on which
these exploits rely can be roughly classified as being one of the following types:
• Time and state attacks
• Denial of service attacks
• Format string attacks
• Code injections
• Race conditions
• Overflows
Buffer, heap, stack overflows
Integer overflows
The divisions and subdivisions are a general overview and they can be seen as con-
tainers for different variations on the same general outline which provides the necessary
motivation for a unified classification such as the taxonomy of “Time and State” attacks.
One substantial subdivision consists in buffer overflows which were introduced and
described in detail by “Aleph One” in Phrack [19]. Buffer overflows rely on the short-
comings of some languages, such as C, that do not allow enforcing a policy for memory
access. Managing memory is left as a task that a programmer must accomplish with no
help from the compiler. In certain cases, this sort of low level access may be preferen-
tial because raw memory access allows developers to write efficient programs. A good
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example could be a platform with low resources where a program could be optimized in
order to deal with the constraints of a limited stack. However, the same freedom also
allows programmers to commit errors and write software that may be vulnerable. Buffer
overflows are considered to be one of the most widespread attacks, since the release of the
Morris worm in 1988 [62].
Consider the following code in Figure 1.1 which illustrates a short program vulnerable
to a buffer overflow attack.
1 void f(char *data) {
2 char s[10];
3 /* No bounds check done */
4 strcat(s, data);
5 }
6 void main(int argc, char *argv)
7 {
8 f(argv[1]);
9 }
Figure 1.1: No bounds-checking is performed which would check whether the character array
s can hold all the data that is copied from the memory referenced by the pointer data.
When the program runs with certain command line parameters, the program passes
the command line parameters to the function f where they are copied into the memory
block pointed to by the character pointer s. The pointer s references a memory block on
the stack that can only hold 10 characters. If the command line arguments exceed this
length then the rest of the memory, past the ten characters bound will be overwritten
by the rest of the data from the command line arguments. Suppose the figure below is
an illustration of the stack before and after the attack. By debugging the program and
by passing identifiable characters to the program on the command line the attacker can
find the location of the return address of the function f. Then by overwriting the stack
and the return address the attacker is able to make the program jump to any memory
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location. Frequently, the slice of stack before the return address is overwritten with opcode
commands that perform some action favorable to the attacker - for example, opening a
shell, as it seems to be the most frequent case. The injected code can be anything as long
as it would fit the storage between the buffer and the return address. In case the injected
code is smaller, the rest of the stack up to the return address may be padded by NOPs,
thereby making the program slide to the return address (Figure 1.2).
If the injected code would fork a command shell, then that shell would run with the
same permissions of the running program. As a consequence, it is commonly suggested to
run system services with low user-permissions in order to limit the capabilities of potential
attackers.
some more stack
char *s
frame pointer fp
return address
main() stack
some more stack
\9A\44\C4\90
main() stack
sp = 0x90C4449A
s[0] s[1] s[2] s[3] s[4]
s[5] s[6] s[7] s[8] s[9]
Addresses
Attacker overwritten memory 
cells containing shellcode. The 
attacker overwrites the return 
address so that the program 
jumps and executes the 
injected shellcode.
Figure 1.2: Writing to memory directly and overwriting the return address in order to execute
arbitrary code.
Resource sharing between threads has been a pending issue because specifying precisely
what resources may be accessed, at different times, by several concurrent processes is
difficult to reason about. A good example would be two processes that access the same
file and write a certain amount of data to that file. Without any policy, it is not clear
what contents the file will have after the two programs run. In fact, even for the duration
of the file writing operations, one does not know what data the file holds at a certain time.
We would not know how to determine the order in which the write operations occur or
whether one program will succeed in writing its data before the other program terminates.
Such problems broadly fall into the category of race conditions, based on the observation
21
that both programs race each other to dump their data to the shared file.
There are two concepts that apply in such cases:
• Thread safety
• Re-entrance safety
Thread safe functions perform actions atomically, within one clock cycle and do not
allow other operations to interfere with the data that they handle. On many platforms,
processes are not able to transfer data to storage instantly. As an example, processes
may write to a file simultaneously, thereby interleaving and overwriting each other’s data.
As stated by the GNU C library manual page, it is feasible to generally assume that
file-writing operations are not atomic. In practice, very few functions and operations are
atomic.
On the other hand, re-entrance safety does not relate to atomicity, but rather to the
fact that some shared resource should not be manipulated in a certain way more than
once. The Zalewski exploit discloses a vulnerability within the Sendmail daemon. A
memory segment is referenced by a pointer and freed once by a signal handler. If the
signal handler would run after the memory is deallocated, the same memory location will
be freed up. This would lead to undefined behavior and the outcome would depend on
the system implementation. In may happen that the second attempt to free the same
memory segment would fail silently or, on other systems, it could result in the whole
program crashing.
There are several conditions laid down by the GNU C library manual which specifies
under what circumstances a function may be considered re-entry safe [28] as explained by
at IBM [47]:
• The function must not hold any static data over successive calls.
• The function must not return a reference to a static non-constant data.
• The function must protect global data by making a local copy of it.
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• The function not call non re-entrant functions.
Going back to the simultaneous file-write example, we can see that input-output (IO)
related functions rely on shared singleton resources, for example hard storage that is
shared amongst all programs. This definition narrows down a whole set of functions to
very few that may be considered re-entrant safe. Following the guidelines, it is sometimes
feasible to rewrite functions in order to turn them into re-entrant safe functions. For
example, looking at the first rule, we could eliminate commands which return pointers to
data defined statically within the function body as illustrated in Figure 1.3.
1 char *global_pointer;
2 void f() {
3 free(global_pointer);
4 }
5
6 int main(void) {
7 f();
8 f();
9 }
char *global_pointer; 1
int flag=0; 2
void f() { 3
if(flag==0) { 4
free(global_pointer); 5
flag++; 6
} 7
} 8
int main(void) { 9
f(); 10
f(); 11
} 12
Figure 1.3: De-allocation of a pointer using a non-reentrant function f on the left in contrast
with a re-entrant safe function f on the right. The memory allocation for global pointer has
been left out for brevity.
The main function would do two subsequent calls to the f function that would result
in a double free corruption. The f function operates on the pointer global pointer thus
making the function f a non-reentrant safe function. In this simple case, we can find a
way around it by simply defining a global variable.
This modification on the right-hand side in Figure 1.3 would make the code re-entrant
safe since the flag would be incremented after freeing the memory referenced by the global
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pointer, and a second de-allocation, upon re-entry of the function f, could be prevented by
a test condition. On the other hand, it is important to note that the test flag==0 is not
an atomic operation and if two threads were to execute the same function simultaneously,
the test may fail twice and free() will be called twice by two different threads which will
not eliminate the double-free issue. The usual solution when dealing with threads that
access resources concurrently is to use a locking mechanism instead.
There are certain interesting things to note about this example. One can observe that
the flag==0 test itself is still required because, once the lock is released, the other thread
may acquire the lock and then proceed through the code. Without the flag==0 test, the
second call of free() would again lead to a double-free error, even if mutex locks have
been used to grant exclusive access to the code-block.
We have shown that this type of vulnerability is based on two distinct concepts:
thread-safety and re-entrance safety. In many cases, both properties have to be used in
order to ensure the safety of a program such as the one given in this example.
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CHAPTER 2
SECURE LANGUAGES AND TOOLS
Certain dialects of C such as Cyclone[22] or Vault[24] implement mechanisms for pro-
gram safety at the language level. These dialects include protections including bounds
checking and regions in order to prevent overwriting of memory segments that are not
bound to a particular code-block. They borrow concepts from Hoare logic [43] and separa-
tion logic [67], sometimes even making logical constructs such as pre- and postconditions
explicit within the language.
As an example Vault makes logic reasoning explicit by implementing user-definable
states. The Vault project at Microsoft Research [35] is centered around controlling mem-
ory and lifespan of user-defined variables and states. As a heavily modified dialect of
C, Vault contains function prototypes and introduces keywords such as the “tracked”-
keyword which allow the compiler to handle those resources more carefully. A function
can thus create resources, dispose of resources and change the states associated with
these resources. Figure 2.1 shows function prototypes that are an example of how this is
accomplished.
1
2 tracked($F)FILE open read(string)[new $F @ readable J];
3 void write(tracked($F)FILE,char)[$F @ writable J];
4
Figure 2.1: The function prototypes use annotations that mark certain variables or functions
as being tracked or untracked.
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In the example above $ is the symbol for key. Vault uses keys to reference resources.
Each resource has an associated key which can be in a certain state. We can observe
the Hoare-style reasoning since the explicit states can be seen as pre- and postconditions.
When the compiler performs a static analysis, it alleviates the programmer’s job because
it becomes easy to spot whether a ”readable” variable or a ”writable” limitation imposed
on a resource has been violated. Trivially, one could not write to a resource that has been
declared as being ”readable” but not ”writeable”.
Cyclone also implements something called ”region handling”, which is perhaps the
first predecessor of the regions that we now find in object-oriented programs such as C#.
Cyclone allows to define a region [30] as being a subpart of the heap containing only the
objects that are allocated in that part of the heap. After use, the whole region along with
all the objects are disposed of entirely which makes common oversights such as dangling
pointers and leaks easier to fix. Also, by allowing the isolation of memory within regions,
buffer overflows become hard to accomplish since the only memory that an attacker could
overwrite is isolated within a slice of the heap.
The Microsoft Research website gives a lot of pointers on how to use Vault, although
the projects has been abandoned in favor of a new project called “Singularity” [34]. This
new system imports concepts from Vault but expands on them by using a new language
called Sing# [45] which is a rough offspring of C#.
Other papers from Microsoft Research mention a tool called “Smallfoot” [6] is an
advanced static checker as well as other similar checkers intended for particular usage -
such as verifying the code-safety of device drivers.
2.1 Vault
Vault is considered to be a safe dialect of the C programming language developed at
Microsoft Research. It provides the same level of safety as C# but additionally provides
the programmer with a fine-grain control over the lifetime and layout of data. Unlike
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Cyclone, which is geared towards security, Vault is built with code safety in mind. For
example, most of the distinctiveness of the dialect can be observed on a higher level
and focuses on function calls, variants, aggregate types as well as borrowing some object
oriented concepts, such as generics. Vault is best seen as redesign of the C language,
unlike Cyclone, which just adds constructs that are meant to deal with security and code
safety. The general impression we get from Vault semantics is that the dialect focuses on
implementing data access control, an off-spin of access control lists, focused on resources,
with little support for the vulnerabilities that Cyclone addresses. More precisely, Vault
adds programming logic, observed at the level of syntax, that allows developers to be
precise about accessing variables. On the other hand, it seems that adding data access
control is largely redundant since it requires the programmer to have a well-defined image
of the code to be written, which still leaves opportunities to make mistakes.
Vault implements modules and interfaces, borrowed from object-oriented program-
ming. Modules are a collection of type, variable and function definitions that can be
seen as a generalization of C-like structures. One can declare modules to be inner or
outer resembling protection levels of simple class objects. Encapsulation can be done by
using the static keyword when declaring variables or functions inside the module. Inter-
faces provide encapsulation and information largely similar to a C-style headers. Similar
to Java, an interface acts as a contract between a module implementation an a module
client. Dynamically, a module can claim or adopt an interface in order to implement it.
Arguably, because of the many object-oriented inspired additions, Vault appears more
like Java than C. It implements objects, complex scoping and all the main characteristics
one would find in an object oriented programming language. Vault is also most likely a
Microsoft predecessor of the C#-programming language where the connection between
the low-level memory access of C and the object oriented C#-programming language
becomes quite shallow: the only borrowed concepts being mainly the syntax.
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2.2 Cyclone
Cyclone is a safe dialect of the C programming language designed to prevent buffer over-
flows and is geared towards security rather than code safety. Cyclone launched as a
collaborative project between AT&T Labs Research and Greg Morrisett’s group in 2001.
The first version of the language was released on 8th of May 2006. Regrettably, since 2006
there have been no major updates to the project and development has ceased. Using a
couple of restrictions, Cyclone claims to maintain the look and performance of C programs
by adding just a few constructs which do not stray away too far from the overall aspect
of the original C syntax:
• NULL checks are inserted to prevent segmentation faults for normal *-type pointers.
• Pointer arithmetic is restricted and pointers are split up into various other subtypes
(those supporting pointer arithmetic and bounds checking like fat pointers, those
which are never NULL and don’t require NULL checks such as ?-pointers and regular
*-type pointers).
• Pointers must be initialised before use.
• Cyclone implements regions to deal with dangling pointers. Onlysafe casts and
unions are allowed (transitions from a certain pointer type to another are restricted).
• goto is disallowed into scopes.
• switch labels in different scopes are disallowed.
• Functions returning pointers must execute return.
• setjmp, longjmp and more generally concurrency are not supported (however Cy-
clone allows thread libraries and agrees to compile yet the resulting program does
not create any threads, they are just there in the form of stubs).
• arrays and strings are automatically converted to ?-pointers.
28
1 /* Standard C Variant */
2 int strlen(const char *s) {
3 int i = 0;
4 if(!s) return 0;
5 while(*s) i++;
6 return i;
7 }
/* Cyclone Variant */ 1
int strlen(const char ?s) { 2
int i, n; 3
if(!s) return 0; 4
n = s.size; 5
for(i=0; i<n; i++, s++) 6
if(!*s) return i; 7
return n; 8
} 9
Figure 2.2: The strlen function in both plain C and the Cyclone dialect side-by-side.
Cyclone also implements a few extensions to the C programming language bringing,
like Vault, some elements of object oriented programming languages:
• Garbage collection for heap allocated values.
• Exceptions.
• Polymorphism that replaces some uses of void *.
The main strength of Cyclone comes from splitting pointers into three categories.
As we can see in Figure 2.2, for the standard C variant, the loop would be unsafe
if s would not be NULL terminated. The Cyclone version forcibly converts the pointer
to a NULL terminated pointer and also allows to check the size of s using a reference
construct. In the plain C example, if s would not be NULL terminated the result would
be undefined behavior (depending on the implementation, a SIGSEGV signal may be sent
to the application).
1 int fun(int *); int fun(int @); 1
Figure 2.3: Two function declarations, side-by-side: the left function is defined using C-like
unsafe pointers and on the right using Cyclone’s fat pointers.
Taking an even simpler example illustrated in Figure 2.3, suppose the following func-
tion was written in standard C. If the function fun would not include a NULL check for
the pointer argument, it might again lead to undefined behavior.
This is telling the compiler that the argument of the function fun should never be
NULL. Of course, it is important to emphasise the fact that this problem could also be
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avoided in standard C by just including a NULL pointer check inside the function which
would return (like in the previous example) if the pointer would be found to be NULL.
Overall, Cyclone brings in some new features to the C programming language also
adding some concepts of object oriented programming languages. It is important to note
that these features are not necessarily based on logic but are rather based on intuitive
reasoning about issues governing code writing and code safety. In other words, the set of
additions try to circumvent common mistakes made by programmers yet they could be
avoided altogether by a careful programmer implementing checks or managing memory
properly.
2.3 CCured
CCured [86] is a source parser that takes plain C code and enhances it by inserting
runtime checks to prevent memory misuse similar to CRED [68]. When the transformed
source is compiled, CCured claims that it able to prevent all memory violations by halting
execution before misusing memory. This comes at the cost of a considerable performance
impact yet it can be improved by adding manual checks and by having CCured exclude
code sections. CCured introduces five primary new basic pointer types. Amongst the
main kinds we find SAFE (not used for pointer arithmetic and requires just NULL-checks
before dereference), SEQ (used in pointer arithmetic but no unsafe casts - it requires a
bounds checking and a NULL-checks), WILD (used in pointer arithmetic, unsafe casts and
does bounds, NULL and dynamic type checks) and some minor ones like RTTI, FSWQ. At
compile time CCured offers suggestions to transform WILD pointers into SAFE and SEQ
pointers. When dealing with pointers, the main difference between Cyclone and CCured
is that CCured infers pointer types based on usage rather than declaration. An issue
common to both Cyclone and CCured is that C-style vararg function definitions do not
require parameters to have an explicit type which makes the static analysis difficult.
However, CCured does not always produce the desired output and although the de-
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velopers claim that they have successfully ported many Open-Source projects such as
Sendmail, Bind and even Apache modules, CCured requires a lot of manual user inter-
vention. Similar to Cyclone, CCured works by substituting memory related functions,
such as malloc(), calloc() and free(). The drawback is that by replacing the mem-
ory allocation functions, the programs become much less portable and create an extra
dependency on CCured’s libraries.
A common complaint that is raised against CCured and Cyclone is that both tools
return indecipherable error messages that are not clear, frequently overlap and thereby
do not help a developer understand or reason about the fault that occurred.
There are other related tools such as the “C Range Error Detector”, CRED [68] that
focus on buffer overflows but aside from memory corruption attacks these tools are not
able to prevent attacks based on program flow. CCured’s strong point is type inference
and CRED [68] goes into a detailed analysis of memory bounds. Neither CCured or
CRED have any constructs that deal with concurrency.
2.4 The GNU Compiler
The GNU Compiler (GCC) offers some minor protections included in the compiler itself
and triggered by specific options. We would like to recall some of the options supported in
the recent compiler releases since they employ standard and well-known techniques such
as honeypots, un-executable stack and address space randomization. Some features, such
as the stack guard protector [11] and address space randomization (ASLR) [70] that have
been formerly analyzed and defeated. A related operating system-level features comes
from GRSEC [64] kernel extensions which randomizes PIDs every time a process runs
although that decreases the portability considerably and breaks programs that rely on
the sequntial PID selection algorithm.
• Source fortification (triggered by specifying -DFORTIFY SOURCE to the gcc compiler).
This is a static check, implementing bounds-checking and is meant to prevent buffer
31
overflows. it is relies on a very simple idea that in certain cases we actually know
the length of a buffer such as statically allocated buffers where the size of the buffer
on the stack is fixed or if the buffer was just allocated using malloc()). If we know
the size, it is arguably easy to ensure that those bounds are not overstepped. This
is a new feature, to be found in gcc version 4.2 onward.
• SSP [82] (Smash Stack Protection) is another feature which can be triggered by the
-fstack-protector flag on recent gcc compiler versions. The addition is inspired
from the concept of honeypots where certain markers are placed on the stack, which
would allow the runtime to detect any tampering with the stack. SSP moves further
and prevents memory corruption by reordering local variables and merges pointers
in function arguments, moving them to an area preceding local variable buffers [20].
Additionally, Linux benefits from a dynamic library called libsafe and more recently
libverify [77] available from Avaya Labs Research that, once linked to a binary, in-
tercepts common C library function calls that are susceptible to buffer overflows and
performs bounds checks in order to make sure that frame pointers and return addresses
have not been overwritten. It is similar to SSP mentioned previously but the greatest
benefit is that it does not require a recompilation of the program and any binary can
benefit from libsave and libverify by linking to them.
2.5 Splint
Splint [53] was formerly named LCLint and is a tool for statically checking C programs.
It is derived from the historical tool called ”lint” now being part of a broader project
which is called LARCH [41]. Splint supports writing stand-alone program specifications
in separate files using LARCH interface Language for C (LCL) and then using them to
statically check code. Splint addresses several problems:
• NULL pointer dereferencing
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• Use of unallocated memory
• Type mismatch
• Bad aliasing
• Infinite loops
• Buffer overflows
• Badly implemented macros
Take for instance a typical NULL pointer dereferencing side-by-side with the Splint
variant as seen in Figure 2.4
1
2 char f(char *ptr)
3 {
4 return *ptr;
5 }
6
1
char f(/*@null@*/ char *ptr) 2
{ 3
return *ptr; 4
} 5
6
Figure 2.4: The declaration of two functions in both standard C and also annotated on the
right with Splint syntax. The difference is that the null keyword in the function prototype in
the Splint variant hints to the compiler that the pointer may be NULL
The notation /*@null@/ tells Splint that the pointer ptr might be NULL. If ptr is
NULL then splint would report an error claiming that there may be a dereferencing of a
NULL pointer.
A good example of ”getters” and ”setters”, similar to the ones we find in C#. Consider
the following code and the Splint annotated counterpart can be seen in Figure 2.5.
Splint allows the programmer to annotate parameters with an /*@in@*/ or an output
parameter /*@out@*/ which hint whether the parameters is meant to be fetched or set
by the function. In the previous example, Splint would report a misuse on storage x not
being correctly defined for get(x) and for huh(x).
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1 extern void set(int *x);
2 extern void get(int *x);
3 extern int huh(int *x);
4
5 int f(int *x, int i)
6 {
7 switch(i)
8 {
9 case 1:
10 return *x;
11 case 2:
12 return get(x);
13 case 3:
14 return set(x);
15 default:
16 return huh(x);
17 }
18 }
extern void set(/*@out@*/ int *x); 1
extern void get(/*@in@*/ int *x); 2
extern int huh(int *x); 3
4
int f(/*@out@*/ int *x, int i) 5
{ 6
switch(i) 7
{ 8
case 1: 9
return *x; 10
case 2: 11
return get(x); 12
case 3: 13
return set(x); 14
default: 15
return huh(x); 16
} 17
} 18
Figure 2.5: An illustration of using ”getters” and ”setters” in Splint.
For accomplishing standard tasks which may lead to errors Splint adds safe library
functions that can be used instead of the glibc complement of functions. The ability
to write annotations and be more precise about variables makes reasoning much easier.
The benefit of using static analyzers are majorly beneficial compared to Vault or Cyclone
because they do not require nor enforce the use of an alternate syntax and they do not
perform runtime checks that may have a performance impact on the program.
Looking at the dereferencing NULL pointer example, the programmer must have some
prior knowledge about the function f and realize that the character pointer ptr may be
NULL. However, if the programmer is aware that the character pointer ptr might be NULL,
then it would be likely that the programmer would already have written a NULL pointer
check in the first place.
2.6 CQUAL
CQUAL [31] is a type-based analysis tool for finding bugs in C programs. It extends
the language by allowing user defined type qualifiers which are used in the same way as
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the standard C type qualifiers, such as const, for example. It can note that values are
”tainted” or ”untainted” which, for system administrators, is similar to Perl’s taint checks
where all user supplied input is considered malicious unless the programmer explicitly
confirms the validity of the provided data. A CQUAL developer is meant to annotate the
program in critical places and CQUAL performs qualifier inferences to check whether the
annotations are correct.
As an illustration, suppose we define a type quantifier ”unchecked” (Figure 2.6) which
we use to mark an object that has not been authorized.
1 struct file * $unchecked fp;
Figure 2.6: Unchecked pointer declarations in CQUAL.
The previous declaration states that the file object fp has not been checked which is
useful if a certain function expects to find an argument to be checked before it could use
that argument. CQUAL performs checks whether the subsequent operations constitute a
type violation. For example, the following calls illustrated in Figure 2.7 are considered a
type violation by CQUAL.
1 void f(struct file *$checked fp);
2 void g(void)
3 {
4 struct file * $unchecked fp;
5 f(fp);
6 }
Figure 2.7: A type violation in CQUAL: the function parameter fp in function f expects a
checked pointer type.
The function f expects a checked file pointer as parameter but the passed pointer is
of type unchecked. This works since CQUAL also introduces the notion of lattices which,
for our example illustrated in Figure 2.8.
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1 partial order {
2 $checked < $unchecked
3 }
Figure 2.8: Lattices in CQUAL.
The example says that $checked is a subtype of $unchecked. Generally, a lattice is a
partially ordered set in which all nonempty finite subsets have a least upper bound and a
greatest lower bound. In this particular example, the lower bound would be considered to
to $checked and the upper bound would be $unchecked. This also has the property that
a $checked type can be used wherever an $unchecked type is expected but any reversal
would result in a type violation.
A derivate of CQUAL has also been used to find Y2K bugs in C programs. CQUAL
has also been used to test [90] the implementation of LSM modules [88].
2.7 UML and UMLsec
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) [52, 33] is a graphical language that helps model,
document, visualize and specify software systems. The language is not restricted to any
level and there are many extensions that take basic rules and expand on them in order to
offer tools for modeling more complex processes such as industrial processes or business
workflows. UML can be used in any case whenever we need to define a clear and structured
workflow where some events take place in a certain order. Loosely, one can see UML as
a visualization tool based on the consequences of a Turing machine where certain events
appear on the outside as a sequence of steps, each step being constrained by certain
conditions. Based on the workflow principle, UML is flexible enough to accommodate
any interaction with any number of participants. In software engineering, where processes
may appear to execute code in parallel, the concurrent interleaving can still be seen as
a composition where each process contributes with actions that have an impact on the
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overall outcome of a program.
UMLSec [49, 48] is an extension to UML that extends the language so that it supports
constructs and constraints that are essential to security. For example, given a message
that has to be exchanged over the Internet, the communication can be tagged as occurring
over the Internet which could make the message susceptible to tampering during the
transaction. Similarly, every prototype define by Ju¨rjens et al. adds constructs which are
useful to tag visual diagrams that are known to conform to specific rules. Using these
tags, the security of a system can be analyzed visually and at-a-glance by following the
rules and constraints imposed on the various components of a software system. Even
though we do not use UML or UMLsec, it is worthwhile to mention that the concepts we
use in our research could very well be included as part of UMLsec because we are adding
code-level restrictions on the interaction between processes. Notions such as stability,
discussed later on, could become part of the tagging proposed by Ju¨rjens et al because
they impose a condition that has to be respected by both participants during a concurrent
interleaving.
Our research approaches security at the level of code by judging on interaction between
different parts of code that become interleaved once there is some concurrent interaction
between processes. On a larger scale, due to the interaction between different processes
or threads, we observe the program as a whole where each individual part contributes a
part to the overall outcome of a program. We notice that the more participants we have,
that contribute to the overall outcome of a program, the more likely it becomes that the
program opens up new avenues for attacks. On the higher level, we borrow some aspects
from UML that allows us to describe the interaction between processes and threads.
Although UML has been used to model higher-level interactions at the level of users
and systems, the markup employed can be applied to the lower levels of programming
languages. For example, if we refer to signals in system programming, we can observe
that the signal system has a client-server model where the process sending the signal can
be seen as a client and the process receiving the signal can be seen as a server. The only
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restriction that permissions bring to the client-server model, is that a client is not able
to send a signal unless the server process runs under the same user-id as the client. This
restriction is the only condition for not being able to send a signal however, in case the
daemon user account has been compromised, any signal can be sent to the daemon under
the same user ID.
Command
CommandCommand
Command
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t1
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Figure 2.9: A side-by-side comparison of an UML diagram on the left hand side and a swimlane
diagram on the right hand side. Control flow can be observed as a series of commands, snapped
together by matching pre- and postconditions. This is similar to a typical UML diagram with
parallel processes.
When applied to security and programs that are highly concurrent, we use swimlane
diagrams (Figure 2.9) that are able to further refine the higher-level model of process
interaction. While the higher-level UML interaction models deal with permissions and
users, we apply the same concepts on the lower code-levels where each participant is
modeled by using a client-server and attacker model. In that sense, for every interaction
between two processes or threads, we offer a specification to which both the client and the
server will have to comply in order to make sure that the interaction is secure. We cannot
force the legitimate participants to comply with a specification we provide but we can
make sure that if they conform to the specification, then we can say that the interaction
is secure.
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2.8 Conclusions
Tools such as Valut, Cylone, CCured, Split, CQUAL and the newer features of the GNU
C Compiler provide the necessary language constructs to reason about software vulner-
abilities, one can observe that they are limited to single processes. These dialects offer
additional annotations in order to address the most common security flaws, such as buffer
overflows or type violations. However, they do not address any kind of concurrent in-
teraction between two different processes. These annotation-based language extensions
have mostly been outdated. For example, Vault has been made obsolete and replaced
by C# by Microsoft. During this transition, very few notions developed in Vault that
address security, have been included in C# - for example, C# does implement regions
and getters and setters but they do not address software security but rather code safety
and optimizations.
On the other hand, abstract languages such as UML and UMLsec, described in Chap-
ter 2.7 do provide a way of describing the concurrent interaction of processes. For the
scope of this thesis, many concepts from UML and UMLsec, particularly the methodology
of describing the interaction of concurrent processes has been leveraged and used in the
“Taxonomy on Layers of Abstraction” Chapter 7.8 in order to reason about attacks and
vulnerabilities.
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CHAPTER 3
FLAVORS OF LOGIC
In order to reason about attacks, several flavors of logic have been reviewed which could
provide an insight on how to seal vulnerabilities and reason about code safety. From this
chapter we leverage concepts and use them later for building swimlanes and to reason
about vulnerabilities.
3.1 Propositional Logic
Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic or statement logic, is the branch of
logic that studies ways of joining or modifying entire propositions, statements or sen-
tences to form other propositions, statements or sentences as well as logical relationships
and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements.
The simplest statements are considered atomic units and hence propositional logic does
not deal with the logical properties and relations that depend upon parts of statements
which are not themselves statements on their own such as the subject and predicate of a
statement. The most thoroughly researched branch of propositional logic is the classical
truth-functional propositional logic which studies logical operators and connectives that
produce complex statements depending on the truth values of the simpler statements used
to build them up. This makes propositional logic to be a formal system for performing
and studying logical reasoning and as such it has a precisely defined grammar.
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Propositional calculus is a formal system in which formulas representing propositions
can be formed by combining atomic propositions using logical connectives and a system
of formal proof rules [56]. These rules allow us to derive other formula based on a set of
formula that are assumed to be true. In turn, these would allow us to build a proof for a
certain assumption by either pushing the axioms forward using the rules or symmetrically
by tracing backward.
3.2 Linear Logic
Linear logic [37] is a type of substructural logic that denies the rules of weakening and
contradiction. The concept of ”hypotheses as resources” is the base of linear logic and
it basically means that each hypothesis is consumed exactly once in a proof. Once a
hypothesis is consumed, it can not be used again. This differs from the previous propo-
sitional logic we had where the judgment is based on truth, which may be used as many
times as necessary. Linear logic becomes very interesting due to this consumption feature
that has inspired an interesting solution to Zalewski’s signal handler attack. It is clear
that if a signal handler can be used only once then one should use some mechanism to
dispose of that signal handler once it has been used. Similarly, by using the bang operator
”!” one can illustrate both behaviors where a certain resource can be used only once or
multiple times. This is very similar to the way that signal handlers are used in various
implementations: as a consumable function that is used only once by unbinding from a
signal identifier or several times where the signal handler is automatically rebound to a
signal identifier.
Linear logic introduces a few new logical connectives. The most important being the
linear implication A ( B which says that an action A is a cause of an action B. A
formula A can be regarded as a resource which is consumed by the linear implication. It
is the most important feature of linear logic and also of the programming based on it. In
classical logic the truth value of the formula A after the implication A⇒ B remains that
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same meaning that the same rule can be applied over and over again as many times as it
is necessary. Classical implication can be ported using a modal operator and by writing
!A ( B meaning that we can use resource A repeatedly. Linear logic also defines the
”multiplicative conjunction” represented by A⊗B and saying that both actions A and B
will be done. There is also the additive conjunction represented by A&B expressing that
only one of the actions A or B will be performed at choice. Another one is the ”additive
disjunction” represented by A ⊕ B which also says that only one of the actions A or B
will be performed yet it is unknown which one of them. Finally, there’s ”multiplicative
disjunction” A ` B which is saying that if A is not performed then B is done, or vice
versa: if B is not performed then A is performed [54].
The bang operator ”!” allows us to hardwire the classical logic version of A ( B.
Writing !A( B (which is written in this form for the sake of example) is basically saying
that A would be consumed but we have an endless supply of A’s [66]. We also use a new
rule called dereliction in order to select on A out of our supply of A’s. Basically this is
saying that if we have an endless supply of A’s, we select one out of them. The problem
is that we can not apply ( B to an !A; we can only apply it to one single A and hence
the need for dereliction. The axioms are also modified to reflect the change brought by
the resource consumption concept.
Computer science relies on computational mechanisms such as function application,
exception handling, method invocations, variable assignments and similar. It is thus nec-
essary to make the mechanisms of these processes explicit by using a formal language.
An event such as A ⇒ B generally describes a transformation from A into B. This
is also extensively applicable to automated processes, more precisely Petri nets, where
a clear protocol must be implemented by following a series of transformations. One
key application of this resource management aspect of linear logic was the development
of a functional programming language which replaces garbage collection by explicit du-
plication [51] operations. Other applications include analyzing the control structure of
programs, generalized logic programming and natural language processing. One interest-
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ing feature is the ability to give a natural aspect of polynomial time computations in a
bounded version of linear logic. This is done, again, by limiting the reuse of specified
bounds.
Linear logic has been the inspiration for the work done on signal handlers in this
thesis. The idea of consuming a resource which is present in Vault and handled by linear
logic, was the starting point for building the non-persistent one-shot signal handlers. If
resources such as keys or regions can be used in a linear sense so that they get removed
from the address space, then the same reasoning could be applied to functions and more
precisely to signal handlers. By making a signal handler one-shot, one would not need
to worry whether the signal handler is re-entrant safe and it would definitely fix the
problems encountered in Zalewski’s study of signal handlers. Furthermore, later on, while
going through the kernel-level implementation of signal handlers, we have seen that signal
handlers do indeed have a flag which may be toggled to make signal handlers consumable.
However, this was part of an effort to make signals portable sine the default behavior
varies from a platform to another.
3.2.1 Vault
Coming back to Vault, we have to note that Vault brings some personal contributions
based on linear and intuitionistic logic. This is based on the concept that a certain
object or variable in a programming language may have a specific lifetime and it is easier
(for example, in cases where we must free up a resource) to reason about them if we
combine the two logics together. DILL [24] comes as an answer to that and explores the
compatibility and transitions from one logic to the other. As a repetition, in intuitionistic
logic we write constructs such as A ⇒ B which can be seen as a function application:
”given an A we can produce a B”. This, of course, can be seen as a function which
can be applied as many times as necessary, taking a parameter and producing a result.
In linear logic, we write constructs such as A ( B which can be seen as a one-way
function application: ”given an A we can produce exactly one B by consuming the A”.
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linear non-linear linear non-linear linear
birth
death
Figure 3.1: All objects are born and die with a linear type. However they may change types
by using adopt and focus.
Such a function would resemble for example a free(), in which we take a parameter
and, in this case, delete it after which that parameter can not be accessed again. By
using linear logic one can efficiently describe such functions yet it is not sufficient and
we need inuitionistic logic for other functions which do not consume parameters since
it is obvious that by building a language solely on linear logic would produce unwanted
results (every variable, function or object will need to be recreated every time and will be
consumed every time after an operation). DILL [5] has sought to combine the two logics
together by exploring how far one can combine inuitionistic logic with linear logic in order
to acquire the functionality of both. This however leads to very complex constructs and
ends up creating the need for another logic (which we describe in the following chapter).
Vault solves the incompatibility between intuitionistic and linear logic by creating two
new concepts: adoption and focus [29]. In Vault, all object die and are born as linear
types. Non-linear objects are temporarily cast to linear by using the let! construct. The
following figure is a representation of the lifespan of an object in Vault depicting the
transition from linear to non-linear and vice versa through the means of adoption and
focus. By using adoption and focus it is possible to change the type of an object however,
as seen in the figure, all objects are born and die with a linear type as illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
Vault uses adoption and focus for the transition from linear to non-linear and vice
versa. Vault additionally implements tracked types and thus keys that protect linear
types and guards non-linear types. If a key k is accessible then all normal operations are
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e1 e2
{k2:T2} + {k1:T1}
tracked(k1) tracked(k2)
{k2:T2}
e2
{k2}    T1 tracked(k2)
Figure 3.2: Adopting e1 by e2.
allowed on the linear type. Similarly, if we hold all the guards for the non-linear type then
all normal operations are allowed. The operations to convert from one type to the other
are called adoption and focus. Since all objects are created as a linear type and since it is
impractical to program without aliasing Vault uses adoption as a way to obtain aliases.
adopt e1 by e2 takes an adoptee, say o1 which is the result of e1 and an adopter,
say o2 which is the result e2 both of linear type and consumes the linear reference to
o1 by creating an internal reference from o2 to o1 (Figure 3.2). Thus, an adoptee has
exactly one single adopter and the result of the adoption expression is a reference to a
non-linear type to the adoptee. This adoptee’s nonlinear type is then its previous linear
type with only one top-level type constructor changed from linear to nonlinear. Access to
o1 is disallowed through the internal reference of the adopter and the non-linear reference
to the adoptee is valid for the entire lifetime of the adopter. Then, any linear components
of the object o1 can not be directly accessed through the non-linear reference since that
would lead to a shared access violation to objects of linear type. However, the linear
components of o1 may be accessed in the scope of a focus operation. When the adopter is
disposed, all non-linear references to the adopted object become inaccessible. Adoptions
stack so one can adopt several objects through multiple adoption expressions. Focus
provides a way to temporarily view an object of non-linear type as a linear type. The
turning point is that any type invariant of a non-linear object can be violated as long as
no alias for the object can witness the violation.
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tracked(k)
e1:{k}
focus x = e1 in e2
x:tracked{n} {k}    T
{k}    T
{k}    T
Figure 3.3: Temporarily viewing an object of non-linear type as a linear type by using focus.
The focus construct x=focus e1 in e2 requires e1 to evaluate to an object of a
guarded type as illustrated in Figure 3.3. This object is called the focus object. The first
thing to do is to bind x to the focused object and give x a tracked type trackedn for a
newly created key. Now, because x’s tracked type, the expression e2 can change the type
associated with the key n and can thus access and replace linear components. Second,
in order to ensure that no aliases can witness these changes, within the context of e2,
the original guarding key is removed. In doing so one guarantees that no aliases of the
focused object are accessible during e2. The focus is ended by revoking the temporary
key n. The code example in Figure 3.4 illustrates how a pointer can be de-allocated using
a non-reentrant function.
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12 void resize({D} cell c) {
3 focus x=c in
4 free x.data;
5 x.data = new array;
6 }
7
Figure 3.4: De-allocation of a pointer using a non-reentrant function f
3.3 Hoare Logic
Hoare logic [43] is a formal system invented by C. A. R Hoare and offers a way to reason
about computer programs and control flow by formalizing the sequential execution of pro-
grams as a series of commands. Hoare does this by introducing the “Hoare triple” which,
in its simplest form is structured as a precondition, a command and a postcondition.
This concept can also be observed in automata, given that any action or command has
an initial, and an end state, the transition from one state to the other is performed by an
action. If that action or command does not terminate, the automata never commutes to
the next state.
This lets us model transitions in programming because a program may be observed as
a sequence of sequential steps [79]. Each of those steps makes a transition from a begin
state by executing a certain command and then ending in an end state. By composing a
sequence of commands we can illustrate the whole control-flow of a program.
3.4 Separation Logic
Separation logic [67] is a substructural logic and an extension of Hoare logic attributed to
John C. Reynolds describing a way of reasoning about programs. Particularly, separation
logic addresses several problems where other logics become hard to understand. Similar
to the mix of intuitionistic and linear logic concepts, separation logic tries to solve certain
issues pertaining to context splitting. Separation logic facilitates reasoning about pro-
grams that manipulate data structures [61], ownership transfers and modular reasoning
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between concurrent modules and brings the concept of local reasoning.
Most important system daemons make serious use of the heap (Apache and other
system related daemons) but without a way to handle memory, heap verification is par-
ticularly difficult. With separation logic, we can address the problem by splitting the heap
into several sub-parts and reason about them individually which is useful when dealing
with concurrency.
3.5 Conclusions
We observe that the overview of the different flavors of logic could potentially provide
the necessary basis for reasoning about vulnerabilities. For example, we can see that the
attack performed by Zalewski in the “Research Context” Chapter 1.3, could perhaps be
approached by making a linear usage of the signal handlers as we do in the “Taxonomy
on Layers of Abstraction” Chapter 7.8. We can also see that similar ideas from linear
logic have been used in Vault, so it remains to be seen what could be done for signal
handlers. The question is whether the signal handling mechanism already has the ability
to use the signal handlers linearly, or whether that would be an additional construct that
would have to be implemented for the Zalewski attack.
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CHAPTER 4
SIGNAL AND EVENTS
Signals are supported by the library but not commonly used on platforms such as Windows
because they are designed to operate in an environment that must provide the means
to interrupt daemons. Windows platforms seem to be more oriented toward graphical
user interfaces where system daemons are uncommon. Thus, Windows makes use of an
event and callback system that is meant to asynchronously process messages sent by the
environment. This works by using an event queue where each process can schedule an
event so that it may be processed at a later time. The Linux alternative for event and
callbacks meant to be used with graphical user interfaces, is an extension of the signaling
mechanism that has been extended. One such example is the libsigc++ [44] library
primarily meant for the gnome graphical toolkit (GTK).
The libsigc++ library addresses issues such as type safety, which is an inherited prob-
lem from the daemon-style signals. One problem that the libsigc++ library addresses
is that any type of data may be passed without any restriction imposed on the types of
variables that are passed to the signal handler. When a callback is triggered, some data
may be passed which is allowed to be of any type. If that data sent to the callback is of
the wrong type it is possible that the expected type does not match the type of the data
resulting in a type mismatch error. libsigc++ addresses that problem by implementing
”slots” which are able to hold a reference to the different callback types.
The process of attaching and detaching a signal handler from a signal identifier is
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brought over from the system daemon variant of signals. At any point during the execution
of a program a signal handler may be attached or detached from a signal identifier.
Another feature of the libsigc++ library, is the ability to define custom signal types.
These custom signals are presented as a template class which allows the programmer
to define their own type of signal. This is a particularly interesting concept and comes
as novelty for signals because in the system daemon variant the signal identifiers are a
predetermined set which does not allow any extensions.
A rough illustration of the problem addressed by libsigc++, in contrast with C, may
be seen in the example shown in Figure 4.1.
1 void click(void *ptr);
2
3 int main(void) {
4 GtkWidget * button = gtk_button_new();
5 char data[] = "Data passed to the click() callback.";
6
7 register_click_handler(button, click, data);
8 }
Figure 4.1: Using sigc++ together with GTK interfaces in Linux systems.
The example code, generates a new GTK button and creates a character array that
will be passed to the click() callback whenever a button is pressed. We can see that
the click() function takes a void pointer as an input parameter allowing any data type
to be passed. Since there are no restrictions imposed on the type of the data passed, the
programming logic in the click callback is unable to infer how the passed data should
be handled.
libsigc++ solves that problem by enforcing type safety and by imposing restrictions
on the type of data that may be passed. An illustration of this can be seen in Figure 4.2
is written in C++ and is using libsigc++ .
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1 class ButtonSignal {
2 public:
3 ButtonSignal();
4 void run();
5 sigc::signal<void, std::string> signal_detected;
6 };
7 void click_handler(std::string s) {
8 cout << "Received: " << s << endl;
9 }
10 void main(void) {
11 ButtonSignal bt;
12 bt.signal_detected.connect(sigc::ptr_fun(click_handler));
13 bt.run();
14 }
Figure 4.2: Using template parameters in the signal handler click handler using sigc++.
The template parameters void and std:string enforce check for consistency at com-
pile time. Also, one may observe that the type is enforced to std::string which makes
this example type safe. Here, the connect method is similar to a signal binding however,
using libsigc++ one can choose to disconnect so that the handler will not run again if a
new signal is received.
4.1 Signal Implementations
The following chapter provides a description of the current kernel 2.6 implementation of
the signal mechanism based on “Understanding the Linux Kernel, Second Edition” [9]
that refers to the old mechanism (before the Linux kernel version 2.4) of signal handling.
We have gone by-hand through the most recent kernel and followed the reasoning of the
code in order to provide an accurate description of the signal-handling mechanism as well
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as some insight on how the new emerging signal mechanism based on sigaction has
evolved. Signals have been used for a long time and started off as a small number and
have grown throughout the years to a full complement of around 60 individual signals,
some user- and some kernel space signals [75, 55].
A signal can be either generated by the user (synchronous signals), either by sending
the signal directly from a terminal, sending the signal from within another process, or they
can be triggered by the kernel (asynchronous signals), for example, illegal instructions or
I/O termination. Signals are executed in user mode and even if the program is running
in kernel mode, the kernel will defer sending the signal until the process drops down to
user mode. It is important to note that a process may only send a signal when it either
has the CAP KILL capability or when the effective user ID that the sending process is
running under is the same as the target process [38]. The exception to that rule is the
first process, on linux systems, process number 1, the init process. This offers a certain
level of protection, due to the fact that an attacker cannot arbitrarily send a signal to
any process on a compromised system. When sending a signal, there are three possible
outcomes:
• The signal is ignored, for example if the signal is not handled in the code.
• The signal is handled using a user-defined signal handler.
• Some default action for the specific signal is executed. For example, certain types
of signals such as SIGSTOP or SIGKILL cannot be caught.
The kernel saves information about which signal and signal handler is to be executed in
the process table. It simply toggles a flag on the specific signal in an array of all possible
signals. Consecutive signals, or concurrent signals for that matter are ignored and aren’t
buffered up. More precisely, the first signal must be processed before a second signal of
the same type can be flagged in the process table.
The following code execution illustrate the atomicity of the signal handlers showing
how one signal after the other gets buffered. In this case, two subsequent SIGINT signals
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were delivered to the program running under the process identifier 22375 as illustrated in
Figure 4.3.
1 void sig_one(int sig) {
2 static int passes=1;
3 printf("Got SIGINT\n");
4 sleep(10);
5 printf("%d passes\n", passes);
6 passes++;
7 }
8 int main(void) {
9 printf("PID: %d\n", getpid());
10 signal(SIGINT, sig_one);
11 sleep(20);
12 }
PID: 22374
Got SIGINT
1 passes
Got SIGINT
2 passes
Figure 4.3: Running the signal handler sig one twice in succession. The output is presented
on the right-hand side.
One signal got processed, and during the sleep(10) of the signal handler, a second
SIGINT was sent. The process waited for the first signal to get processed and then executed
the signal handler again showing that the SIGINT was buffered.
However, if we repeat the experiment with two different signals, we notice that sig one’s
sleep cycle was interrupted by the second signal SIGHUP, sig two was executed and then
execution came back to sig one which printed out 1 pass as illustrated in Figure 4.4.
Using the newer interface sigaction one can also choose to clear this table or the
process can be made to ignore a certain signal. Regarding concurrency, POSIX, in newer
variants such as newer kernel distributions make a clear distinction between process signals
using the normal kill() function and thread signals through pthread kill() [25]. The
question that arises is who actually receives a signal in case of a program spanning multiple
threads. In case of user generated signals, or synchronous signals, are delivered to the
thread which has not blocked the signal and asynchronous signals (those generated by the
kernel from illegal instructions, for example, faulty I/O) are delivered to the thread which
triggered the signal in the first place. In case of a symmetric multi-processing systems
(SMP) where several threads are distributed amongst processor, the kernel manages to
send a message to all CPUs involved in the execution of that certain process making sure
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1 void sig_two(int sig) {
2 printf("Got SIGHUP\n");
3 }
4 void sig_one(int sig) {
5 static int passes=1;
6 printf("Got SIGINT\n");
7 sleep(10);
8 printf("%d passes\n", passes);
9 passes++;
10 }
11 int main(void) {
12 printf("PID: %d\n", getpid());
13 signal(SIGINT, sig_one);
14 signal(SIGHUP, sig_two);
15 sleep(20);
16 }
PID: 22401
Got SIGINT
Got SIGHUP
1 passes
Figure 4.4: Delivering two signals SIGINT, respectively SIGHUP and using two different sig-
nal handlers sig one, respectively sig two to process the signals. The output of the test is
illustrated on the right hand side.
that all threads receive the signal at the same time [73].
One thing to note is that signals can be regarded as the software equivalent of hardware
interrupts. More precisely, once a signal has been delivered, execution would stop exactly
at the point where the signal was delivered and switches over to the signal action. Either
a handler is installed to process the signal or the process ignores it. When the handler
returns, execution switches back to the point where the signal was initially received and
the program resumes from that point. The sense of concurrency comes from the fact that
a signal may be triggered at any point in time and the execution of the main event loop
will be halted until the signal action has returned. However, the the signal handler does
not run concurrently with the main event loop. In case two signals of the same type are
delivered, the second signal will be discarded. This is not the case if the two signals are
different but they will be stored in a buffer in the process table waiting execution.
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4.2 Sending a Signal
Whenever a process or kernel task wishes to send a signal to a process, the kernel generates
the signal for that process [9]. In order to do that, the kernel relies on several functions,
the most notable of those being the following:
1. do send sig info() - This is the standard way of generating a signal under the
current kernel (as of 2.6.35).
2. force sig info() - This function forces a process to react to a signal, even by
overriding SIG IGN and setting it to SIG DFL, if necessary.
There are other available functions which are variations of previous, as well as several
functions dedicated to broadcasting signals to process groups. do send sig info() is a
wrapper which first checks whether the requested signal identifier is within valid bounds
as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
1
2 if(valid_signal(sig))
3 return -EINVAL
4
Figure 4.5: Checking whether a requested signal identifier is within valid bounds.
If it is valid, it acquires the signal spinlock of the receiver process, send the signal
and then release the spinlock. This is done via the functions lock task sighand, respec-
tively unlock task sighand() and can be observed in the kernel source as illustrated in
Figure 4.6.
1
2 if(lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) {
3 ret = send_signal(sig, info, p, group)
4 unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
5 }
6
Figure 4.6: Acquiring a spinlock in order to be able to send a signal.
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Acquiring the spinlock is done within the lock task sighand() function by polling
the RCU. If the spinlock is acquired, the send signal() function does a check for
process namespaces, a new feature of the 2.6 kernels and passes the structures to the
send signal() function. The send signal() function asserts the acquired spinlock
and then proceeds to fill in the siginfo t table with a new signal item.
1
2 if (q) {
3 list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
4 switch ((unsigned long) info) {
5 case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_NOINFO:
6 /* ... */
7 case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV:
8 /* ... */
9 default:
10 copy_siginfo(&q->info, info);
11 if (from_ance?tor_ns)
12 q->info.si_pid = 0;
13 break;
14 }
15 }
16
Figure 4.7: Creating a new signal by filling the siginfo t table with the new signal item.
This varies from the previous kernels in that the case distinction here is made between
the defined value of SEND SIG NOINFO identifying the signal as being sent by an userland
process, or SEND SIG PRIV for a signal sent by a kernel function. Additionally process
namespace handling is done in the default switch block as seen in Figure 4.7.
Another new notable feature here is that, if the signal cannot be added to the queue
since it would exceed the maximum number of queued signals or if there isn’t any free
56
memory left, the kill() must not be allowed to fail since it is the only way the user may
terminate the process and recover the system. If the signal generated was a real time
signal sent by the user using anything other than kill(), the kernel aborts the sending
by returning EAGAIN as illustrated in Figure 4.8.
1
2 trace_signal_overflow_fail(sig, group, info);
3 return -EAGAIN;
4
Figure 4.8: If the signal queue is full or no free memory is available and if the generated signal
is a real-time signal then the kernel aborts by returning EAGAIN.
Otherwise, the signal is sent but without the info structure to ensure that the process
receives the signal as seen in Figure 4.9.
1
2 trace_signal_lose_info(sig, group, info);
3
Figure 4.9: Sending the signal without the info structure in order to make sure that the signal
is received, even if there is no free space left.
The signal is then added to the queue for delivery (Figure 4.10).
1
2 signalfd_notify(t, sig);
3 sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
4 complete_signal(sig, t, group);
5 return 0;
6
Figure 4.10: Adding a signal to the queue and scheduling a delivery.
If the send signal() function succeeds and the signal is not blocked, the kernel
tries to wake up the destination process by setting the sigpending flag, sending an inter-
processor interrupt in case the signal is currently running on a different CPU and then
proceeds to check whether the process is interruptible so it will be able to process the
signal. Finally, the unlock task sighand() releases the spinlock and returns the error
value of send signal().
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The second function we mentioned, force sig info() is the same with the only dif-
ference that it resets the signal to the default state SIG DFL in case the destination process
had previously blocked the signal via SIG IGN making sure that the signal will go through.
4.3 Receiving a Signal
The kernel signal handling works on a simple queue principle. It spins around and de-
queues pending signals while other signals are enqueued. This is done by the function
get signal to deliver() which repeatedly invokes dequeue signal() until no non-
blocking pending signals are left as illustrated in Figure 4.11.
1
2 for(;;} {
3 ...
4 signr = dequeue_signal(current, &current->blocked, info);
5
6 if (!signr)
7 break; /* will return 0 */
8
9 if (signr != SIGKILL) {
10 signr = ptrace_signal(signr, info, regs, cookie);
11 if (!signr)
12 continue;
13 }
14
15 ka = &sighand->action[signr-1];
16 ...
17 }
18
Figure 4.11: The kernel then proceeds to dequeue the signals in the queue until no signals are
left.
The first check is whether there still is a pending signal on the queue. This is done by
checking whether dequeue signal() returns a signal or not. At the end of the loop, the
ka variable gets the address of the action data structure associated with the signal to be
handled.
Depending on the contents of the signal data structure, a process to which a signal
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was delivered reacts in one of the following possible ways:
1. Ignores the signal explicitly by having previously set the flag SIG IGN on the current
signal mask. When processing the signal, a simple check is made to determine
whether the SIG IGN flag is set as illustrated in Figure 4.12.
1
2 if(ka->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) {
3 ...
4 continue;
5 }
6
Figure 4.12: If the signal handler has been decoupled from the program, then the default
behavior is to ignore the signal. This is done by checking whether the handler is set to SIG IGN.
2. Catches the signal by previously binding to the signal with a signal handler. Once
the signal is received, the kernel changes the execution state of the process and the
signal handler associated with the signal runs. this corresponds to a non-standard
code jump in which the process state is stored and control flow switches to the signal
handler attached to the signal. After execution of the signal handler, the state is
restored and the process resumes from where it left off. If a signal handler has been
bound, the kernel invokes handle signal.
3. If the signal is neither ignored explicitly nor trapped by a signal handler, the process
executes the default action associated with the signal. There are 31 traditional
signals and an extension of 32 modern real-time signals, each corresponding to
a default action which will be triggered unless the signal is specifically ignored
or caught. As an exception to that rule, there are two signals which cannot be
ignored or caught by the process: SIGKILL which terminates the process immediately
and SIGSTOP which suspends the execution of the process. The difference between
SIGKILL and SIGSTOP is that SIGKILL terminates the process immediately whereas
SIGSTOP suspends the process allowing continuation by the delivery of another signal
SIGCONT.
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The checking for the signal is done by switching on the signal number. For SIGCONT,
SIGCHLD, SIGWINCH where the default action is to ignore, the kernel just passes through
using continue as illustrated in Figure 4.13.
1
2 case SIGCONT:
3 case SIGCHLD:
4 case SIGWINCH:
5 continue;
6
Figure 4.13: For signals where the default action is to ignore, the kernel puts them together
and passes though to the next signal without processing them.
4.4 Handling Signals
Handling signals varies between platforms because it involves switching back and forth
between userland and kernel space. We provide a general overview of the signaling mech-
anism, sometimes lightly based on the x86 platform when a concrete example is needed.
As we mentioned before about the possible signal sending outcome, if a handler has
been installed by a process receiving the signal, the kernel enforces the execution of
the handler by running handle signal. Once the signal is handled by the process,
the kernel makes sure that the other signals are processed on the next invocation of
do signal. This is done by returning from the handle signal function immediately
after the handle signal call as seen in Figure 4.14.
1
2 if (handle_signal(signr, &info, &ka, oldset, regs) == 0) {
3 current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_RESTORE_SIGMASK;
4 }
5 return;
6
Figure 4.14: The process receiving a signal identifier is instructed to handle that signal iden-
tifier immediately. The kernel enforces that behavior with the handle signal function.
Signal handlers have to run in user mode, however handle signal runs in kernel
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mode. When a signal is received, the process switches into kernel mode. Upon return
do signal calls handle signal which sets up the user mode stack. This is done via the
setup frame and setup rt frame calls depending on whether the signal was a real
time signal or not.
When the process switches back to user mode, the installed signal handler’s address
has already been pushed onto the user mode stack and the program counter adjusted to
point to the signal handler. This is the mechanism through which the kernel forces the
execution of the signal handler in user mode.
When the signal handler returns the return block placed by the kernel on the user
mode stack by the previous setup frame and setup rt frame calls is executed which
invokes the sigreturn call responsible for copying back the contexts. The original context
of the program is also restored via the restore sigcontext function call and the program
may resume execution.
After the user mode stack is set up, handle signal goes through the flags associated
with the signal. This is where, for example, the decision is made between a persistent
rebinding to the signal or a one-shot signal handler type as shown in Figure 4.15.
1
2 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_ONESHOT)
3 ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
4
Figure 4.15: At this point the type of the signal handler is checked. If the signal handler is
meant to rebind to the signal identifier and has the SA ONESHOT flag toggled, then the default
behavior is restored.
By checking the SA ONESHOT flag, the signal is reset by forcing the behavior of the
signals back to the default behavior flag SIG DFL.
4.5 Signal Handling and Exceptions
We reason about the the current signal handling mechanism in order to provide a better
and more secure way for dealing with signal interleaving. We aim to prevent the attacks
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such as the ones described in Zalewski’s paper [89], the WU-FTP daemon exploit [39]
or the Sendmail exploit by redesigning the signal handling mechanism and introducing
exceptions as substitutes for the signal handler functions. On an abstract level, we use
continuations and traces to reason about the exceptions handling mechanism. On the
implementation layer, an extension is possible using the already existing exception mech-
anism, perhaps one can enable signals to be trapped by using regular try...catch blocks.
By extending exceptions with signals, we could also trigger exceptions from outside of the
process by delivery a signal. We have cases, such as Sendmail, where a longmp() is used
together with a signal handler in order to emulate an exception behavior and break out of
the main event loop. Using the current exception mechanisms, there is no way to trigger
exceptions within another program. We have different types of IPC to allow message
passing between processes. However these are heavyweight systems with intricate meth-
ods of operation and we believe that the lightweight possibility of triggering exceptions
in a running process externally would greatly increase the functionality and flexibility of
a program without overloading it with additional data-passing. As a general guideline,
a signal handler is meant to run for a limited amount of time and do as little as possi-
ble. Any signal handler which exceeds a certain level of complexity should probably be
replaced by some other form of IPC which is more suitable for a concurrent context.
4.6 Persistent and Non-persistent Signal Handlers
One interesting property of signals is that they may be declared to be one-shot, thereby
granting a signal handler the ability to be consumable, so that they can only be called
once. The motivation for this distinction is the exploit described in Zalewski where a signal
handler containing non-reentrant function is called twice by delivery of two carefully timed
signals and thereby causing a double deallocation memory corruption.
The idea of reasoning about interchangeable persistent and non-persistent signal han-
dlers is inspired by the two different implementations of the signal mechanism. On Win-
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dows systems, a signal handler is non-persistent by default, meaning that after the signal
has been processed, the process will not re-attach to the signal and a second delivery of
that signal will be ignored. On POSIX systems, the signal handler is re-attached to the
signal after it has been called, thus making the signal handler persistent and allowing it
to be called several times.
Because of implementation differences, we think that it would be useful to be able
to dynamically switch between the two behaviors. By doing so, one could use a non-
persistent signal handler for the exploit presented in the Zalewski paper. Intuitively,
since the problem described in that paper is a non re-entrant signal handler, if do not
allow the signal handler to be called twice, then one pass through the signal handler would
free up the referenced memory and then decouple the process from the signal identifier.
Thus, a second pass through the same signal handler would not be allowed which prevents
the double deallocation memory corruption.
There are several cases, where the distinction between persistent and non-persistent
signal handlers can be seen as a feature rather than an error of portability as described by
CERN. The ability to choose between the two types of behavior would fix a wide range
of exploits that we have gathered during the literature overview.
Reasoning using control-flow we can find three types of signal handler mechanisms
with different behaviors that can be found in various implementation. We illustrate the
main body b and the handler h using separate lanes, similar to an UML diagram where
each process is on a separate lane. Even though signal handlers do not run concurrently
with the main thread, signals may interrupt a main thread at any time and then execute
some code.
In Figure 4.16, we illustrate a typical scenario that can be found on Windows platforms
that have a signal implementation. In this case, the main thread b is interrupted at some
point by the signal handler h that runs some code and then returns precisely where the
main thread was interrupted. As we can see, the pre-condition for the signal handler h
is marked with Ph whereas the post-condition of the signal-handler is emp indicating that
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Figure 4.16: Non-persistant signal handler: Control flow transfer from the main thread b to a
signal handler h.
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Figure 4.17: Aborting signal handler: The two handlers h and g can interrupt each other
before returning to the main thread b.
the signal handler will not run again. Later on, using rely and guarantee we are able to say
more about the signal handler and the pre- and postconditions but at a glance we cannot
infer too much about what the signal handler’s post-condition will be. Implementation-
wise, the signal handler h will not be re-installed and will run only once - a programmer
would have to re-install the signal handler again after the first run in order to allow the
signal handler to run multiple times.
Comparable to exceptions, two installed signal handlers h and g can interrupt each-
other (Figure 4.17) if a second signal is delivered while the first signal handler runs.
Signals and signal-handlers can be seen as a rudimentary form that proceeded exceptions
due to the fact that we are able to nest signal handlers using different signal identifiers.
In the last scenario in Figure 4.18 we have the UNIX-style signal handlers that auto-
matically re-attach themselves after being run. In this case we have a pre-condition Ph
and a post-condition Qh ∨ emp the outcome being either some post-condition from the
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Figure 4.18: Aborting signal handler: The two handlers h and g can interrupt each other
before returning to the main thread b.
signal handler h or emp.
In all cases we can observe that even though the signal handler is not a self-standing
thread that runs concurrently, the signal handler can interrupt the main thread at any
time which would change or invalidate the original precondition for the body. This is of
particular interest to security because at any point in time for the duration of the program,
a signal handler may interrupt the program and alter some shared data-structures and
when the signal handler returns, the main body may not expect the shared data to have
changed. Unless the programmer is ready to install and uninstall signal handlers, the
program has to be able to adapt to any changes to shared data structures. Since most
operations are not atomic, just running the signal handler at an inappropriate time may
corrupt some part of memory - most typical cases include interrupting the body while
some file handling operations are running.
This leads to a whole avenue of attacks where vulnerabilities arise due to control flow
transfer between different parts of code at inappropriate times and are remarkably easy
to commit in a highly concurrent environment.
4.7 Conclusions
Unfortunately we have seen in Chapter 4.1 that signals such as SIGSTOP and SIGKILL
cannot be caught and handle. This may have security repercussions because if an attacker
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would have the necessary permissions to send the signal then the daemon would suspend
or terminate, respectively.
However, from the overview of signals and event-handling mechanisms, we have ob-
tained the necessary information to be able to seal vulnerabilities such as the Zalewski
attack. The signal handling mechanism benefits from the one-shot flag that could make
a signal handler decouple and run only once which is explained in the “Handling Signals”
Chapter 4.4. This allows us to distinguish between persistent and non-persistent signal
handlers, explained in the “Persistent and Non-persistent Signal Handlers” Chapter 4.6
which is precisely what is needed to reason about the signals or event-based vulnerabilities
as well as potentially offering solutions.
It is important to note from the “Persistent and Non-persistent Signal Handlers”
Chapter 4.6 that signal handlers do not run concurrently with the main thread. This
simplifies the analysis of signal-based attacks because commands would be then composed
sequentially rather than in parallel. Nevertheless, we can see from the “Sending a Signal
Chapter” 4.2 that a process can send a signal at any moment, and that the receiving
process has to be ready to handle that signal. This means that while within the receiving
process the commands are composed sequentially, a signal can arrive at any time so that
sending and receiving signals occurs concurrently between processes. sdsdf
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CHAPTER 5
TAXONOMY ON LAYERS OF ABSTRACTION
From the gathered literature overview, we have seen that “Time and State” vulnerabilities
have not been studied in detail, particularly the attacks related to “Signals and Events”
and “TOCTTOU” vulnerabilities. The purpose of this thesis is to bring order to only the
vulnerabilities related to “Time and State” and it seems possible that the taxonomy can
be extended to other types of vulnerabilities. The taxonomy presented here is thus an
analysis of “Time and State” vulnerabilities, with the purpose of classifying them, that
focuses primarily on “Signals and Events” and “TOCTTOU”.
One of the reasons that prompted this research was that we noticed that “Signals
and Events” and “TOCTTOU” are not self-standing isolated classes of vulnerabilities
and that they may have connections to other vulnerabilities. As an example, we take an
additional step to show that “DoS” is also part of “Time and State” and that “DoS” can
be observed as having connections to both “Signals and Events” and “TOCTTOU”.
When we refer to attacks, we refer to the methodology that is used to exploit a
vulnerability in a software package. However, the taxonomy classifies vulnerabilities rather
than attack patterns. Different tools (such as traces, RG, stability, etc...) are used to
reason about why the attacks are happening, what vulnerabilities a software package has
and further, to illustrate the possibilities for preventing those attacks.
The two terms, “attacks” and “vulnerabilities” are not interchangeable, for exam-
ple, we may study an attack-pattern that exploits a “TOCTTOU” vulnerability but the
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vulnerability and the means to prevent it is classified in our taxonomy, rather than the
attack pattern. We may analyze the methodology used to exploit a vulnerability, but the
taxonomy offers defenses against those attacks.
Where language constructs from the “Secure Languages and Tools”, Chapter 2 address
software security, they fall short in addressing concurrency issues. However, UML and
UMLsec offers a framework to describe this interaction and based on UML, and the
concepts from the “Flavor of Logic” Chapter 3, this chapter shows how one could reason
about attacks and vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities in software packages and attacks that exploit them can take many dif-
ferent forms. There have been several attempts of bringing some order to classifications,
variously called “Top Ten Vulnerabilities”, “Seven Deadly Sins” or “Pernicious King-
doms” [78]. The latter classification by McGraw et. al is perhaps the most scientific one
because it tries to classify vulnerabilities by borrowing the idea of a taxonomy from biol-
ogy. In doing so, vulnerabilities can then be classified using a hierarchy which shows that
vulnerabilities are not unrelated but that they can inherit certain traits. One such king-
dom, for instance, is malicious input that encompasses a wide-range of vulnerabilities. As
standard techniques of input sanitizing are more widely adopted, McGraw predicts that
more sophisticated attacks will become increasingly dangerous, such as the class of “Time
and State” attacks.
The taxonomy, as an extension to a workshop paper [16] and elaborated in the “Inter-
national Journal of Secure Software Engineering” [17], tries to reason about attacks and
attempts to build a taxonomy by studying attack patterns from different perspectives.
We call these perspectives, ”layers of abstraction” because vulnerabilities can be studied
on different levels: starting from high-level concepts (such as traces, rely-and-guarantee,
stability), going through a level of fixes that could be applied in batch, and down to
code-level fixes that can be applied to individual software packages. For example, a vul-
nerability that can be found in a software package may be reasoned about using logic,
then a general fix could be applied to the whole codbase or that particular vulnerability
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Category: Time and State︷ ︸︸ ︷
kingdoms related to the vulnerabiltiy
Reasoning︷ ︸︸ ︷
theory related to the vulnerability
Refinement︷ ︸︸ ︷
altering code to fix the vulnerability
Instances︷ ︸︸ ︷
code-level fixes, MITREs, CERTs
Kingdoms
DoS Signals and Events TOCTTOU
Phylum
Traces RG Stability
Order
Refinement Control Flow
Species
MITRE CERT
Figure 5.1: The taxonomy is annotated using McGraw’s et al. terminology. Each layer
describes a level of abstraction and every vulnerability can be classified by following the tree
structure of a given attack. The upper layers are populated with abstract concepts such as
“TOCTTOU”, “Signals” and even more broadly“DoS” and reach down to lower layers where
attacks distinguish themselves by local defects in a software package.
could be fixed as a single instance.
For example, a software engineer may fix a vulnerability on the code layer based on
the attack pattern, however if that vulnerability is part of an important class of attacks,
for example the “TOCTTOU” class of attacks, then that should be an indication that
there may be other flaws within the program that may have to be addressed as well.
The previously mentioned classifications do not hint to that possibility, but rather list
vulnerabilities by citing the vulnerable code from the software package and summarily
list the reasons why the flaw exists.
Similarly, the fixes that the other taxonomies present are local and pertain to a certain
code-segment and they do not illustrate a general methodology that could be applied for
the whole code-base. While companies such as MITRE and CERT list vulnerabilities
separately (and exhaustively), the “Taxonomy on Layers of Abstraction” can group these
disparate mentions of vulnerabilities and classify them together in a tree-like structure.
The terminology of “Kingdoms”, “Phylum”, “Order” and “Species” are only crudely
related to our taxonomy and we adopt only the structure of the biological taxonomy. We
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use that terminology in order to provide a distinction between abstract security concepts
and code-level safety issues on the lower layers of the tree.
Compared to biology, in terms of security, vulnerabilities with similar traits on the
upper layers will be grouped together. We limit the article to the kingdom of Time-of-
Check-To-Time-of-Use (“TOCTTOU”) and “Signals and Events” as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.1.
In biology, the “Kingdom” [72] rank is reserved for very high level classifications with
a broad variety of descendants. McGraw’s taxonomy, as well as our taxonomy follows
the same principle. The very upper layers are reserved for abstract concepts which prop-
agate to the lower levels of the taxonomy tree. We limit the article to the kingdom of
“TOCTTOU” and “Signals and Events” which are both part of the “Time and State”
category.
The “Phylum” in biology is a grouping of organisms based on a general abstraction
of structure [81]. In our taxonomy, the “Phylum” is populated by the abstraction layer
holding general concepts related to the program structure such as traces, states and
predicates.
The connection between our taxonomy and the rank “Order” is that biological ranks
group elements together based on small but important differences. For example, Zoology
makes a distinction between moths and butterflies - which is not a trivial distinction. In
our taxonomy, “Order” represents general elements of flow control and refactoring [32] the
result of which may slightly change the code but sufficient enough in order to distinguish
between a program and the re-factored equivalent.
“Species”, being the last layer of the biological classification, represents individual
instances of the upper ranks. Similar to biology, where around 10 million different species
of bacteria are distinguished, our taxonomy reserves this layer for all known and classified
instances of a certain vulnerability. For example, in various software packages and listed
on the numerous software vulnerability sites such as CERT or CVE.
Although these ranks were selectively chosen with the intent of relating to McGraw’s
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classification, it is plausible to extend the number of layers. For example,“Time and State”
would be a superior layer that could be added before the rank of “Kingdoms”, perhaps
named “Domain”. For example, we explore software vulnerabilities stemming from the
code-level however, privacy and cryptography might be other high-level concepts, perhaps
placed at the level of “Phylum”. One instance thereof, might be information leakage or
weak cryptographic keys and would extend the taxonomical tree.
DoS itself is an atypical member of the “Time and State” kingdom because it is
frequently observed by effect rather than cause. We can observe a distinction between
two types of DoS attacks which we give as examples in order to elucidate why DoS appears
independently in taxonomy trees that do not seem directly related to DoS itself.
When Zalewski attacks Sendmail, or when shaun2k2 attacks Wu-FTPd, the purpose
is to gain access to the system but, as a consequence, those services are disrupted. For a
high-traffic service, that results in a DoS for the users currently connected and relying on
that service. This type of attacks seem to force the program into an a state that it was
not designed to handle.
One can recall hardware DoS attacks that used a light cast on a processor in order
to flip bits [46]. From a technical perspective, we can see hardware attacks as a form
of DoS because the processor is flooded in order to make the currently running program
transition to some favorable state for the attacker. This is another example that falls
within the Zalewski and shaun2k2 type of DoS because it plays on diverging control flow
within the program even though the means of exploitation does not occur at the software
level but rather at the hardware level. This is also closely related to the confused deputy
problem mentioned in Chapter 5.2.1 because the software layer is not aware of the pressure
exerted by the hardware layer that is able to manipulate control flow in the program to
be exploited.
On the other hand, we have direct, software-based DoS attacks that are based on
resource exhaustion. Network floods, shell bombs are some examples as well as DoS
attacks based on regular expressions. The first two are perhaps the most trivial examples
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because it is obvious that their sole purpose is to consume resources. The shell bomb
really just forks itself recursively, claiming more and more resources from the operating
system and network floods make requests that a server is inclined to satisfy. We have
found that the resource exhaustion based DoS seems to be a more predominant attack
pattern but that the flow control based DoS is a clear indication that some service is being
exploited for the sake of gaining access. Specifically, some attacks may result in a DoS,
although the intent of the attack was to gain access. DoS, as we will notice further on,
shows up many times, implicitly, as a consequence, rather than being an intended part of
the attack.
With the ever increasing threat of botnet-type [1] attacks, it is important to see re-
source exhaustion DoS as one of the most savage attacks but it is equally important to
mention that such attacks also impose pressure on the attacker’s resources and that they
cannot be maintained indefinitely. As such, resource exhaustion-based DoS is a primitive
form of attack that, from the attacker’s perspective, has a temporal benefit and is far
distant from the eloquence of a carefully staged attack.
5.1 Overview
We leverage some technical concepts from programming language theory such as pred-
icates, traces and program refinement as well as depicting traces by using “swimlane”
diagrams. Given these tools, we then reason about TOCTTOU in Section 6 and signal
handling attacks in Section 7.
The “Background” section 5.2 summarizes all the formalities that are used later on
in the article. Although we use pictographic representations of traces, we follow-up with
a section that instantiates the formalities to practical scenarios, followed up by case-
examples of vulnerabilities in some of the most popular software package. For every
example, we offer the reader some hints on refinement and how issues could be fixed by
moving, removing or encasing misbehaving parts of code.
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As a result, a wide range of software packages, including major system daemons have
been analyzed using the proposed taxonomy on layers of abstraction. The results are sum-
marized in the figures in the “TOCTTOU” Section 6.9, “Signals and Events” Section 7.7.
We additionally offer a table in the “Taxonomy” Section 7.8 which maps diagrams to
software.
In the end, we conclude that similar attack patterns can be classified together if they
share the same tree-based representation.
5.2 Background
In order to reason about program flow, we make use of traces [23] which represent a series
of state transitions allowing us to reason about control flow. Concurrent interaction is
difficult to track because it occurs at runtime and because there may be multiple points of
failure in a program that may lead to an opportunity for an attack. Also, it is worthwhile
to note that most of the time it is not clear what parties or threads are involved while the
program runs. A program is a series of sequential steps and, with very few exceptions,
these steps are not executed atomically. Every step executes some command or performs
some action which may establish a small invariant for the next step to be executed. As
an example, these invariants can range from assuming that files exist, or that a certain
flag has been set to some value, or that some concurrently running thread has finished
executing and other similar examples. These invariants can become easy to violate in cases
where users have the ability to influence a program - either directly, by accessing some
exposed part of the API (for example, system daemons that offer an interface to trigger
actions within a program) or indirectly by modifying something in the environment where
the program runs. Once invariants are violated, the program may make false assumptions
about what is going on in the environment and this could lead to other actions that
compromise a system.
Perhaps, one of the most interesting remarks, is that looking back at the research
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context in Chapter 1.3 one can observe that invariants at runtime are not necessarily
violated due to the interaction of programs but that there are cases such as “Re-entrance
safety” where programs can be coerced into a state by the legitimate actions of users.
A legitimate action could constitute manipulating a program by accessing that program
using an interface and when “Signals and Events” are involved (Chapter 4) just triggering
a handler at an inappropriate time may be sufficient to violate some invariant and thereby
compromise a software package.
For that reason, it is necessary to be able to break down a program into its smallest
components and to be able to study code by segments rather than as a whole program.
As a practical comparison, one could break down a program at the level of assembler
instructions, or machine language, down to the lowest level and study the program at the
level of instructions. Instead of doing that, a more elegant way to study attack patterns
that rely on invariant violations would be to make use of some logic reasoning that would
be able to break down chunks of code into their lowest components.
This is the case of traces [23], originally used for Petri nets, that are able to illus-
trate a snapshot of a program. In this thesis, traces are applied to security and are used
to reason about interactions on the lowest levels - whether these interactions occur be-
tween concurrent programs, or whether the interaction takes place between the user and
programs.
Traces are defined formally as a sequence of state changes:
t = (σ1, σ
′
1)(σ2, σ
′
2) . . . (σn, σ
′
n)
where σ1, σ2, . . . , σn represent starting states and σ
′
1, σ
′
2, . . . , σ
′
n represent ending states
so that every end state follows a starting state (σ′i = σi+1). The length of a trace is
variable, so that any number of state pairs may be contained within a trace. In practice,
this allows us to study a vulnerability in a program independent of the rest of the code.
Traces can be composed sequentially, in order to describe a larger code segment. For
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example suppose that we have a trace:
t1 = (σ1, σ
′
1)(σ2, σ
′
2)
and a trace:
t2 = (σ3, σ
′
3)(σ4, σ
′
4)
We can compose the trace t1 and t2 and name that resulting trace t
′ such that t′ = t1 ·t2
iff σ′2 = σ3 and additionally the trace t1 is a terminating trace. Although, the concept of
”terminating trace” is not specifically used for the taxonomy, a terminating trace denotes
a trace that has successfully completed execution. This notion is helpful in order to build
proofs.
We use two binary predicates, the rely R which represents a set of conditions that
a state-change made by a trace t depends on and the guarantee G which represents the
set of conditions that the state-change will guarantee to the environment. For example,
a process might require that a shared resource does not change during an operation. R
and G represent informally a mutual contract between the state of a process and the
environment.
For example, let there be a trace:
t = (σ1, σ
′
1)(σ2, σ
′
2) . . . (σn, σ
′
n)
We write t rely R iff
(σi, σ
′
i) |= R for 0 ≤ i ≤ n
and t guar G iff
(σi, σ
′
i) |= G for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We say that, if a trace’s rely R is respected by the environment and that trace offers
some guarantee G to the environment, then that trace is a well-behaving trace. In other
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words, if a traces’s rely R is respected by the environment and furthermore that trace
offers the guarantee G, then that trace complies with the specification of the program.
By sequentially composing traces, we can specify that a rely or guarantee has to be
maintained for the duration of the composition of traces. Suppose that we have two
traces t1 and t2 and that we compose them together such that t
′ = t1 · t2, then we say
that t′ rely R iff:
t1 rely R and t2 rely R
Similarly, for the guarantee G, we say that t′ guar G iff:
t1 guar G and t2 guar G
Intuitively, this means that if we have a trace t′ that describes a sequential composition
of multiple traces t1 and t2, then the trace t
′ relies on a given rely R, respectively offers a
given guarantee G to the environment if and only if all the traces in the composition rely
on the same rely R and offer the same minimal set of guarantees G to the environment.
Each trace may have a pre- and postcondition [43] which are similar to assertions. In
terms of predicates, if a precondition P1 holds before a trace t, and if P2 is the postcon-
dition for the trace t, then P2 will hold after t takes place.
Another concept we use in our taxonomy is called “stability”. Stability allows us to
define a set of requirements imposed on a trace. We use the pre-post operator . that takes
states satisfying a precondition P1 (s |= P1), to some states satisfying a postcondition P2
(s′ |= P2). If that transition occurs under certain conditions, represented by the rely R,
we write P1 . P2 ⊆ R which represents the stability condition that a transition relies on.
P1 and P2 are unary predicates while the rely R is a binary predicate representing a set
of pairs.
For example, suppose we have a trace:
t = (σ1, σ
′
1)(σ2, σ
′
2)
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If the precondition for the trace t is P1 and thus σ1 |= P1, and if we write P1 . P2 ⊆ R
then it must be that σ′2 |= P2 or else the rely R for the trace has been violated.
We name this “stability” because it allows us to specify some invariant that can be
maintained for the duration of a trace. This is precisely the logical framework that is
needed to reason about what we have mentioned in the previous chapters about smaller
invariants within a program. Since many commands are seldom atomic, it is possible for
an attacker to inject its own trace. For example, suppose that for the duration of one
or more commands some shared variable must remain unchanged. In this case, for those
commands, the shared variable becomes part of the rely and the stability condition would
specify that the variable must not be changed for the duration of that trace.
To understand stability in terms of programming, consider the following program
illustrated in Figure 5.2 that is meant to compute 210 and print out the result.
1 double result = 1;
2 extern fpow(int b, int e) {
3 do {
4 if(e & 1) result *= (double) b;
5 e = e >>1;
6 b *= b;
7 } while(e);
8 }
9 void sighandler(int signal) {
10 result = 0;
11 }
12 int main(void) {
13 signal(SIGHUP, sighandler);
14 fpow(2, 10);
15 printf("%.0f\n", result);
16 }
Figure 5.2: This program binds via signal identifier SIGHUP to the signal handler sighandler,
then starts to compute the 210 using the fpow function. It does that by storing the intermediary
result in the global variable named result. After the function fpow terminates, the result is
printed out.
In the case illustrated in Figure 5.2, we can say that if the precondition for the program
is that result = 1, then the program relies that a signal will not be sent and if that rely
is satisfied then the postcondition of the program will be that result = 1024.
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In terms of predicates, suppose that the precondition of the program is P1 = {result =
1} and that the intended postcondition of the program is P2 = {result = 1024}. The
stability condition for the program is that P1 . P2 which is included in the rely P1 . P2 ⊆
R. The specification we give is that the rely R has to be maintained for the duration
of the program. If the rely R is not maintained for the duration of the program, then
P2 = {result = 1024} may not hold after the program terminates.
In terms of traces, the program can be described as a sequential composition of several
traces:
t′ = t1 · t2 · . . . · tn
The stability condition P1 . P2 ⊆ R means that at the beginning of the program, the
first state of the trace t′, and thus the first state of trace t1 satisfies P1 then the last state
of the trace t′, and thus the last state of trace tn must satisfy P2 in order for the rely R
to not be violated. Where, in the example illustrated in Figure 5.2, P1 = {result = 1}
and P2 = {result = 1024}.
This tells us that for any prefix of the trace t′, the rely R must be granted by the
environment. In practice that means that for any intermediary step during the calculation
of 210, the value of the global variable result must not be changed by an external program
by sending a SIGHUP signal.
It is also interesting to observe from Figure 5.2 that the precondition for the program
is indeed P1 = {result = 1} and if we had a trace before t′, named t′′ then we can only
compose t′′ and t′ as in:
t′′′ = t′′ · t′
if and only if the postcondition of t′′ allows the variable result to have the value
1. For a counter-example, consider a case where a concurrent thread would have access
to the variable result. If that thread sets result to anything else other than 1 before
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letting the program run, then the postcondition of t′′′ would not be P2 = {result = 1024}
even though t′ is the last trace and the program terminates.
We do not reason about what the outcome will be if the rely and guarantee have been
violated, but in the example illustrated in Figure 5.2 one can observe that the outcome
of violating the program’s rely, will be that the value of result may be 0, which is not
the intended behavior of the program.
We also cannot force a trace to be well-behaved, we can only offer a specification of
a program. If the program respects that specification, then we can say that the program
is safe. We do not reason about what will happen after the safety of the process has
been compromised because that may lead to a wide range of consequences. Instead, we
offer a minimal set of required conditions and restrictions so that the program may be
well-behaved and safe.
Using this fine-grained semantics, we are able to pin-point the exact reason for a
misbehaving program. If a trace consists of a number of state changes, then all prefixes
of that trace rely on R and must also guarantee G to the environment. In the event that
certain traces have to be re-wired or even eliminated, the program may not offer the same
set of guarantees to the environment and might violate the program specification.
The process of studying a certain vulnerability of a software package cannot be auto-
mated just by using traces. Traces provide a high-level overview of a code segment or a
program but they require the rely and guarantee sets to be clearly defined. This cannot be
automated unless one already has a thorough analysis of what the code expects and offers
to the environment at each step. Although that may not be feasible in practice, given such
a specification of a program, it would be possible to automatically check whether that
specification is respected and that invariants are maintained throughout the program.
5.2.1 Traces and Swimlanes
We represent traces using swimlanes such that each lane, depicted by a vertical grey bar,
represents a process lane. Each trace is also annotated with a precondition and a post-
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condition. Control flow may be observed by following the connective arrows from top to
bottom that represent the concurrent interleaving between traces. Whenever some inter-
leaving occurs, the connective arrows cross over the red lines which represent the “trust
boundary”. The trust boundaries are a reference to the confused deputy problem [42]
where some process influences another indirectly by causing some control flow branching.
Based on the trace semantics introduced in the previous chapter, a swimlane repre-
sentation of the program is able to show only an isolated snapshot of an attack. It does
not represent an image of the whole program. That is, in a swimlane diagram, the top
and bottom do not represent the full length of the program but rather a slice of the code
that is affected by the vulnerability to be studied.
For example, suppose we have a trace t and a trace decomposition t = t1 · t2. Trace t1
has precondition P and postcondition Q and belongs to a process, while the second trace
t2 has the precondition Q and the postcondition S and belongs to a different process. We
can represent the composition of the two trace t1 · t2 by using two swimlanes, each one on
different swimlanes belonging to one process as can be seen in Figure 5.3.
Q
S
t2
P
Q
t1
Figure 5.3: Example of a two-process interleaving of two traces in sequence. The postcondition
of the trace t1 becomes the precondition of the trace t2. Code-wise, this is an example of
sequential execution where the result of a former action may be observed in the subsequent
actions.
Similarly, we can also represent two or more parallel traces running concurrently.
Suppose we have two traces t1 and t2. Their parallel composition t1./t2 can be represented
in the swimlane notation as two threads on two different lanes on the same level. In this
case, P is the precondition for trace t1 and the postcondition is Q. Symmetrically, for
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trace t2 we have precondition R and postcondition S as can be seen in Figure 5.4.
P
Q
t1
R
S
t2
Figure 5.4: Example of two traces, t1 and t2 representing two processes or threads executing
commands in parallel. In this particular case, there is no interleaving in what regards control
flow and the two threads are independent.
The dashed line separating the processes in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 represent trust
boundaries which do not necessarily separate processes. There may be cases, for example,
where two traces belong to the same process but due to the interaction the boundaries
are still there and observed implicitly as a trust between code segments. Whenever an
interaction takes place between processes, these boundaries are crossed either indirectly
by triggering some action or directly by altering some shared resource.
P1
P2
t2
P2
P3
t3
P2 ∨ P3
P4
t4
P1
P2
t2
P2
P3
t3
P2 ∨ P3
P4
t4
P2 . P2 P2 . P2
Figure 5.5: On the right, the stability condition P2 . P2, provided by the program’s specifi-
cation is respected so that under safe circumstances the postcondition of the trace t2 must be
P2. On the left, the stability condition P2 . P2 is not respected and the attacker injects its own
trace t3.
Sometimes, given a program running in a concurrent context, it is necessary to em-
phasize that a transition from a postcondition to a precondition must conform to some
set of rules. This is useful, for example, in vulnerabilities where control flow or a shared
resource has been altered by an attacker. A stability condition P2 . P2 ⊆ R may be
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imposed on the transition from the precondition P2 to the postcondition P2, or, in this
case the postcondition P3.
In our diagrams, a stability condition is placed between two traces on the same swim-
lane indicating that the transition from a postcondition of a trace to the precondition of
another trace is governed by a relation R. In the swimlane representation (Figure 5.5),
t2 and t4 represent two traces belonging to the process on the left swimlane and t3 is a
trace belonging to an interfering process on the right swimlane. The stability condition
here is that P2 . P2 ⊆ R which means that the predicate P2 belonging to the process
containing the traces t2 and t3 must be stable and included in the rely. The traces, and
the predicates are presented in an abstract form; however, in our examples we instantiate
the traces and the predicates individually on a case-by-case basis, given an example of a
vulnerability.
We know that an attacker trace can only interfere by violating the stability conditions.
If the attacker disregards the stability conditions, then we know that the safety of the
process has been compromised. We do not study what will go wrong after the safety of
the process has been compromised. Instead, we are able to offer the minimal required
conditions so that the program may be considered safe.
The swimlane representation of traces is inspired by UML [33]. There have been
similar advances in computer security, mainly by Jan Ju¨rjens proposing an extension
to the UML language, called UMLsec [49] which adds semantics for secure information
flow, role-based access control, and extensions for data security. The flow of diagrams is
inspired and similar to message sequence charts [4] - where processes are able to exchange
messages at different times. The message passing structure is present in the swimlane
diagrams implicitly due to the fact that the reasoning is applied at the level of what
processes expect at any given time. In that sense, it may be the case that there are no
messages exchanged between processes but due to the environment that is shared between
them, some process may rely on some invariant that can be influenced by a concurrently
running process. In the scope of flow-control, we do not need a rich structure to represent
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concurrent processes and properties because in this case, the passed data or the channels
for exchanging information are irrelevant for the type of attacks that we analyze.
5.3 Program Refinement
Refinement [32] means to apply a series of transformations to a program so that program
flow is changed into a more favorable one, either having optimizations in mind or, in the
article’s scope, code safety with the explicit condition that the behavior of the program
has been maintained. A useful refinement in our taxonomy is a refinement that eliminates
unsafe behavior.
Compared to refactoring, Roberts mentions in his thesis that “informally, a refactoring
is correct if the program behaves the same after the transformation as it did before the
transformation” and, further on concludes that “a refactoring is correct if a program that
meets its specification continues to meet its specification after the refactoring is applied”.
Although Robert’s thesis is not focused on concurrency, this goes well and hand-in-hand
with what we we do when we rearrange traces to avoid a vulnerability, in the sense that
we just refine or adapt that definition to a context which includes concurrency. Just as
Roberts has a specification, we have our own specification for refactoring programs, which
includes concurrency concepts such as rely and guarantee. The difficulty lies in the fact
that given unknown dependencies between the environment and a program, whenever we
refactor a program in a concurrency context, the resulting refactored program will never
preserve the entire behavior (including, in our case, the outbound behavior) of the original
program.
Since we cannot assume anything about what the environment depends on that should
be provided by our program, we may at most say how much a refactoring has altered the
original program. In doing so, we at least provide some information to the environment
about what the refactoring has changed internally and the environment would have to
adapt to those changes. We are changing the specification of the program implicitly when
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we apply a refactoring in a context where concurrency should be taken into account.
Since a program may be represented as a series of state changes, those changes may be
observed at runtime. A refactoring of the code will influence that series of state changes.
For example, given a trivial program that just declares a variable of an integer type and
then assigns a value to it and terminates, a refined version of that program may satisfy
the “overall functionality” of that program. However in doing so the refinement might
alter the execution leading to the final result. For example, by first assigning 1 to the
variable and then incrementing the necessary amount of times in order to reach the value
in the original program. Under the assumption that compiler optimizations are turned
off, the two programs may look differently on machine level with several intermediary
execution steps that are different between the two programs.
In this case, the original program may have a declaration and an assignment whereas
the refactored counterpart may have a series of assignments. Although a trivial example,
when dealing with concurrency and shared resources, in the background Section 5.2 we
have seen that state-pairs may offer a guarantee and depend on a rely. The problem
is that depending on how the program is refactored, we might not be able to offer the
same set of guarantees to the environment. Due to the fact that some other concurrently
running program may depend on the intermediary steps which have to be factored out
for the sake of security.
Summing up, when code-level changes are made by a refactoring, some states may
have changed. That is what we call a partially legal refactoring which is what we use
for the “Signals and Events” branch of our taxonomy. We call it partially legal because
by Robert’s definition, we are preserving the overall behavior of the program but we are
removing a part of it so that the specification of one program is not identical to the
refactored result.
In the solution we offer to the Zalewski signal handler exploit, the signal handler,
after we refactor the program, will not be able to be called multiple times as it was the
case in the original program. In that particular exploit and given how it is originally
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written, the signal handler will always trigger a double free corruption. However, if the
situation were different, some concurrently running program may have depended on that
signal handler to run multiple times. When we refactor a program we may damage the
relationship between our original program and the environment. By refactoring we might
solve an issue yet on a larger scale, other programs might be broken and expecting the
old behavior of the refactored program.
All refactorings that change states should be considered partially legal since some
part of the original program’s behavior has been changed but the refined result is not
identical to the original program. Thus, in a heavy concurrency context, one should be
precise about how much the program has changed due to a refactoring if we the outward
behavior must be preserved.
As an example of our “TOCTTOU” kingdom, the refactoring implies inserting locks
to make sure that sensitive parts of code are made atomic. This particular type of
refactoring would not alter the internal structure of the program at runtime too much
since the refinement that needs to be applied does not eliminate already-existing states.
5.3.1 Program Refinement using Swimlanes
A graphical refactoring from an initial vulnerable program’s diagrammatic representation
to a safe program swimlane is a refactoring where the swimlanes have been changed so
that the attacker’s traces are prevented from interfering with the main program. On a
swimlane diagram we illustrate that by fortifying the trust boundary between processes
and by annotating the diagram with stability conditions. This graphical refactoring can
be seen in Figure 7.8 which summarizes the transformation of vulnerability swimlane
diagrams to safe swimlane diagrams.
In the example cases for “Time and State” and “Signals and Events”, we have found
that the following refactoring methods are the are the most relevant for a program refine-
ment:
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• Moving code around or discarding code, done by skipping commands using jumps
or exceptions. This type of refinement applies to “Signals and Events”.
• Enforcing a stability condition by using locks to guarantee the atomic execution of
several sequential commands that are susceptible to “TOCTTOU”.
The difference between the two types of refactoring can be observed in the swimlane
representation of the original program and the refined counterpart. An entirely legal re-
finement will not change the structure of a program by rearranging traces (Figure 5.6)
but will instead add code such that a stability condition has been enforced. For exam-
ple, by encasing or wrapping vulnerable code between locks. This is the case for most
TOCTTOU attacks where the internal structure of the program should not necessarily
be altered in order to seal a vulnerability.
P1
P2
t1
P2
P3
t2
P2 ∨ P3
P4
t3
P1
P2
t′1
P2
P3
t2
P2 ∨ P3
P4
t′3
P2 . P2 P2 . P2
Figure 5.6: An entirely legal refactoring of a program is performed that alters the structure of
the program on the left so that the attacker’s trace t2 does not interfere with the traces of the
program. The left swimlane diagram thus represents an insecure program where an attacker is
able to influence a program and the right swimlane diagram represents a secure program - from
the perspective of control flow.
On the other hand, we can compare the refinement needed to fix TOCTTOU problems
to the refinement that is needed to fix Zalewski’s signal handler exploits. If we look at
Figure 5.7 we can observe that the only change between the original program on the
left and the refined result on the right is that a stability condition has been enforced to
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prevent an attacker to change the outcome of a transition. None of the traces that the
original program had have been factored out and the original behavior has been preserved,
with the exception that the TOCTTOU vulnerability has been prevented by the stability
condition P2 . P2.
P2
P3
t2
P1
t1
P4
t3
P5
t4
P2
P3
t′2
P1
t′1
P4
P5
t′4
P8
P9
t5
P8
P9
t5
Figure 5.7: A partially legal refactoring of a program. The structure of the original program
on the left changes in the refactored counterpart on the right so that the trace t3 is factored
out. By factoring out the trace t3 the meaning of the program is changed which makes the
refactoring a partially legal refactoring.
Compared to Figure 5.7, the partial-legal refactoring of the Zalewski signal handler
vulnerability, leads to the removal of the trace t3 so that the program on the left hand
side is different from the refined program on the right hand side of the swimlane diagram.
It is also obvious to observe in practice that by decoupling the signal handler the behavior
of the program changes considerably from the perspective of control flow.
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CHAPTER 6
TOCTTOU
A race occurs whenever two or more processes compete for a shared resource. This has
the side-effect of potentially leaving one or both processes in a state which they were not
designed to handle. On older hardware where there no true concurrency was available (for
example, without support for threads or multicore processors), the simplest preventive
measure was to check whether a resource exists before it was used. However, on modern
architectures [85] operations on resources are seldom atomic and the assumptions made
at the time of check may not hold at the time of use. This weakness is exploited by timed
attacks, classified under “TOCTTOU” in our taxonomy.
6.0.2 Anatomy of a Redirection Attack
System call wrappers provide a method through which the kernel security model may
be extended so that system calls may be intercepted [76]. However, in a concurrent
setting, operations are seldom atomic and the operations made by system call wrappers
are susceptible to timed attacks.
One example is described by Watson [83], where a shared memory segment is accessed
by three different processes. A process pushes an address onto a shared memory segment,
which is then read by a kernel process and validated. A third process, the attacker’s
process, overwrites the address after it has been checked. This is a typical instance of
a TOCTTOU attack since the address that is read back by the kernel from the shared
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P2
P3
t2
P1
P2
t1
P3
P4
t3
P4
P5
t4
P3 . P3
Figure 6.1: Three concurrent processes interleaving using swimlane representations: a descrip-
tion of a TOCTTOU redirection attack. The SHM segment is updated t1 from userspace and
passed to the kernel on the middle lane t2. The kernel reads the segment (t2), checks for a
valid address (P2) and leaves it on the segment (P3). The memory segment is then read by the
attacker and altered t3. After the address has been abused, it is placed back on the segment
(P4). The stability condition P3 . P3 marked in red is not respected and the attacker is able to
inject its own trace t4. The equivalent code-example is given in Figure 6.3 by the concurrent
interleaving of three processes.
memory segment has been altered and, most likely, made to point to a different address.
In order to solve this problem, one would specify a rely condition so that the memory
segment will not be tampered with between the time of check, represented by trace t2 and
the time of use, represented by the trace t4 as can seen in Figure 6.2.
If the attack trace t3 does not alter the postcondition of the check, then the precon-
dition for the user trace would be P3. However, if the attack trace t3 does interfere, the
precondition for the user’s trace results in the precondition P4. We explicitly add a sta-
bility condition P3 . P3 which illustrates that the predicate P3 should not change between
the traces t2 and t4 thereby disallowing the interference.
On the lower layers of the taxonomy tree for this attack, the solution is to lock down
a resource between the time of check and the time of use. There are several methods
available, such as transactions [69] or mutex locks [12]. Another option would be to
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P2
P3
t′2
P1
P2
t′1
P3
P4
t3
P3
P5
t′4
P3 . P3
Figure 6.2: Compared to Figure 6.1, the stability condition P3 . P3 is enforced by locking
down the shared memory segment. This does not allow an attacker trace t3 to override the data
placed on the segment in t′1. Code-wise, in Figure 6.3 the solution would be to lock down the
add resource.
use fractional lock permissions [8] which would still allow other concurrent processes to
read from the shared memory segment. The advantage of using fractional permissions
would be that, instead of locking down the resource, we would still allow other concurrent
processes to read from the segment. Fractional permissions get us closer to Roberts’ claims
on refactoring that a program ”continues to meet its specification after the refactoring is
applied” and in this case, it is particularly important to be watchful about outbound
behavior.
Instantiating the Predicates
We take a code example based on the system call wrappers (Figure 6.3) in order to reason
about the predicates. We assume that the flag add is a shared resource between all three
concurrently running processes. The first transition is made by the user’s process which
sets the variable to 0. After which, the kernel checks the variable and if it is still 0, it
sets the variable to 1. Before the kernel uses the variable again, the attacker has already
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Kernel
if(add == 0)
add=1;
User
add = 0;
Attacker
add = 0;
add = add +1;
Figure 6.3: An interleaving of a kernel process, a user process and an attacker process showing
how a variable add may be changed between the time of check and the time of use. The abstract
swimlane diagram of this attack can be found in Figure 6.1.
set the variable back to 0. The result is that the variable add now carries a value of 1
instead of 0.
Following the pre- and postconditions described in the previous section, the user’s
postcondition P2, becomes the precondition for the kernel’s assignment and can be rep-
resented by add == 0, which represents a stability check by the kernel on the code-layer.
After the kernel checks the variable, it sets that variable to a value of 1, represented here
by the trace t2, which then becomes the precondition for the attacker’s trace. We can ob-
serve that the attacker’s trace t3 ignores the precondition of the last trace and overwrites
the variable blindly by setting its value of 0. As a consequence, the kernel increments the
value of the variable add during the trace t4 under the assumption that the precondition
is unchanged.
In this case, the attacker has no direct control over the control flow in the kernel
process. However, by altering the shared resource add, the attacker is able to influence
the outcome of the program.
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6.0.3 Anatomy of an SQL Denial of Service Vulnerability
Concerning networking one of the challenges is to establish a protocol for allowing mul-
tiple processes to access the same resource without creating any race conditions or dead-
locks [14]. Although TOCTTOU problems have commonly been noticed in UNIX soft-
ware, the same concept applies to databases [58]. When inserting a row in a database one
would first use a SELECT statement and check whether that row already exists. If that
row already exists, the database returns an error. Otherwise, the database returns the
number of rows modified, indicating that the insertion succeeded.
Sending SELECT before an INSERT call sounds like a feasible solution to make sure that
e-mails are unique when inserting into the database. Even if the code in Figure 6.4 uses
prepared statements that make command-injections less likely, in this case the same code
may be called by a user that is concurrently accessing the website which could potentially
lead to hijacking the first user’s thread.
my $sql = "SELECT 1
FROM USERS
WHERE e-mail = $email";
my $sth = $dbh->prepare($sql);
$sth->execute();
my $val = $sth->fetchrow_array();
if ($val) {
# a row was returned therefore e-mail in DB
# output error-handling page
}
else {
# no row returned so do insert statement
# and write normal page
}
Figure 6.4: One way to make sure that entries are unique is to first check them using a SELECT
statement and act upon the result by sending an INSERT statement if the row is not populated.
The method was suggested by Paul on the perl SQL mailing-list [58], but is susceptible to
TOCTTOU attacks given that other users may access the database at the same time.
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P3 ∨ P4
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t4
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P7
t3
P3 . P3
Figure 6.5: The interleaving of three processes: the user on the left hand side, the server
executing the check in the middle and the attacker on the right. The predicates P3 and P4 are
disjoint and represent both outcomes of the SQL statement. The trace t1 belongs to a user, the
trace t4 to an attacker and t2 belongs to the server.
The susceptible code segment in Figure 6.4 lies between the check using if($val),
and the INSERT statement that, as indicated by the comments, would be part of the else
block. One possible solution would be to not use a SELECT statement at all, but instead
to prefer using INSERT IGNORE INTO that will not cause an abort. The error-handling
part, could be implemented by using the Try::Tiny module and displaying an error page
when the entry already exists.
Assuming that an attacker is able to observe the transaction, for example as an online
form submission, the attacker is able to send an INSERT request concurrently with the
INSERT of a legitimate user. This may cause a denial of service for the legitimate user
since the attacker’s request will be handled first.
A better solution would be to use LOCK TABLES to ensure that the table a process has
to write to is locked down [50]. In the worst case, the result would be an error sent by
the database engine saying that the requested INSERT cannot be performed.
In Figure 6.5 we can see that the user traces (left hand side) and the attacker’s traces
(right hand side) run concurrently. Both the user and the attacker run exactly the same
statements in t1, respectively t4 feeding data to the engine, represented here by the trace
t2. However, since the attacker is able to influence the scheduling process on the server,
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Figure 6.6: In contrast with Figure 6.5, when using table locking is used, we are able ensure
that one single session gets handled per SQL statement. This prevents an attacker from injecting
its own SQL statement before the legitimate user gets a reply from the database.
the request is handled in favor of the attacker who receives a message indicating that the
request was successful t5. This also has consequences for the user, because at this point
the server considers that the legitimate user has already been registered and that is why
TOCTTOU attacks may also be seen as a subtle form of DoS.
Instantiating Predicates
We can instantiate P2 to the check done by the SQL server that tests to see whether
no other row exists for a particular primary key. However, since the attacker is able to
observe the e-mail and is also able to manipulate the scheduling decision of the server, the
attacker’s request might get processed before the legitimate user’s request is processed.
After the trace t2 runs, two possible responses are sent to the attacker and the user. The
precondition for the user’s trace t3 is P3 ∨P4 which represents a check to see whether the
row has been inserted successfully leading to P3 or if that row already exists leading to
P4. Since the attacker’s request has been processed first and the row has been inserted,
the precondition for the user trace t3 becomes P4.
The stability condition illustrated in the Figure 6.5, P2 . P3 ⊆ R, specifies that the
user process relies on a positive result from the SQL server. In this particular case, the
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user’s process is resilient to DoS: although the stability condition has been violated, the
user’s process does not lock up, waiting for a successful outcome. Instead, it receives a
result from the SQL server, indicating that the row already exists and is robust enough
to handle the error by taking action in t3 based on the unsuccessful result P4. This is also
illustrated by the disjunction P3 ∨ P4 which indicates that the process is able to handle
both outcomes. Depending on how the client is programmed, that is not always the case
and a process might deadlock and keep waiting for a positive outcome.
In practice, comparing the initial code at Figure 6.4 with the Figure 6.7 we can observe
that the elegance of following the trace reasoning and locking down the tables allows us
to still perform SELECT statements while the tables are locked down. This ensures that
for the duration of the code illustrated in Figure 6.4 we are still able to perform SELECT
statements and still avoid the TOCTTOU vulnerability.
It is the case that databases make table-locking atomic, which guarantees that there is
no possible interleaving of traces between locking and unlocking the tables. An interesting
consequence is that instead of refactoring the code to check for errors as the mailing-list
suggests is that inserting locks would not require a major rewrite. It is difficult, if not
impossible to reason about TOCTTOU statically because most concurrent interleaving
takes place at runtime. However, automation in such cases may be possible if one is able
to determine which traces could be manipulated by an attacker.
One may classify the vulnerability under TOCTTOU attacks and use table locking
thereby making the rely of the client stronger. Or, one may choose to implement some
form of access control. There may be other solutions, which just strengthens our case
about building a taxonomy tree based on common weaknesses rather than distinctive
solutions.
6.0.4 File Redirection Attacks
Filesystem attacks involve creating a softlink or altering the file between the time that a
process validates it and the time when it is used. Many UNIX programs are affected [84],
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my $sth = $dbh->prepare("LOCK TABLES");
$sth->execute();
my $sql = "SELECT 1
FROM USERS
WHERE e-mail = $email";
my $sth = $dbh->prepare($sql);
$sth->execute();
my $val = $sth->fetchrow_array();
if ($val) {
# a row was returned therefore e-mail in DB
# output error-handling page
}
else {
# no row returned so do insert statement
# and write normal page
}
$sth = $dbh->prepare("UNLOCK TABLES");
$sth->execute();
Figure 6.7: Following the suggested code from Figure 6.4, the locking variant allows for SELECT
statements to still be used, without leaving an opportunity for TOCTTOU attacks open.
starting with a simple text editor like vi and ending with the upper VFS layer in the
kernel.
Typical to this scenario, three parties are usually involved: the user requesting some
file operation, the program initiating the check on the user specified file and the attacker
replacing the file with a redirection to a different file. Even if the check and the file
operation are bunched together, there is still some delay which would allow an attacker
to replace the file or redirect via a symlink to a different inode.
The trace swimlanes for this attack are identical to those in Figure 6.1, which were
discussed earlier in Chapter 6.0.2 and, not incidentally, we notice that the same solutions
apply. A rely condition is placed by the process executing both the check and the use,
in Figure 6.1 illustrated by the traces t2, respectively t4, so that the same preconditions
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apply at the time of check and at the time of use.
Symlink attacks also fall in this category and they are wide-spread on UNIX systems
and targeting programs such as vi, joe, emacs but also administrative processes such as
checkinstall and installwatch in earlier, incipient versions.
Instantiating the Predicates
In a typical filesystem attack, given the swimlane representation in Figure 6.1, one could
correlate the result of some check performed by the filesystem to the postcondition P3.
After than, an attacker replaces or redirects to a different file, possibly represented in the
figure by the trace t3. This will make the process write to the attacker’s file in trace t4,
instead of the original file and would formally lead to P4; the result of the attacker’s trace
t3.
The usual scenario of a file-based TOCTTOU occurs with binaries that have root
permissions and are able to read any file on the filesystem. A typical example can be seen
in Figure 6.8 that uses access and fopen.
1 if(access("file.dat", R_OK) == -1) {
2 fprintf(stderr, "No permission to access file.");
3 return -1;
4 }
5 fp = fopen("file.dat", "r");
Figure 6.8: The call to access ensures that the program has the read permissions to the
file.dat file. If the program does not have read permissions, then it prints out an error
message and returns. Otherwise, the file is opened in read mode.
Both access and fopen operate on filenames rather than file-handles, which means
that the file file.dat could be replaced between the call to access and the call to fopen.
The usual attack pattern is that an external, concurrently-running program monitors the
calls (for example, by reading file-access tables or through timing attempts) and then
unlinks file.dat and creates a symlink from file.dat to a file that an attacker wants
to read - for example, say password files. The consequence is that the fopen call will read
the password file instead of the file.dat file.
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Looking back at Figure 6.5 this can be seen in the swimlane diagrams as altering the
post-condition for the outcome of access to P4 instead of the expected P3 because the
attacker is able to influence the traces of the program. The solution is similar to SQL
TOCTTOU and can be seen in Figure 6.6, if the filesystem permits unique access to
file.dat for the duration of both access and fopen calls taken together.
Regardless whether we are dealing with shared memory segments or files, data is
referred to by pointers and there is no explicit guarantee that the referenced data has not
been altered in any way between two operations which is what TOCTTOU attacks rely
on.
6.0.5 Refinement of TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities
In both cases, it would be sufficient to use some form of locking in order to fix the
vulnerabilities. For example, some form of locking could be used to ensure that both the
read and write operations are performed on the same data. In this situation, the two
state pairs between the time of check and the time of use must satisfy P2 . P3 where P3
is the postcondition of the check and P4 is the precondition for the use.
The advantage of using locking or some form thereof, is that the specification of the
program is minimally altered: all the original behavior has been preserved and atomicity
is provided for transitions that are unsafe.
6.0.6 Taxonomy for TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities
TOCTTOU attacks subscribe to the same overall pattern as can be seen from Figure 6.9.
Originally TOCTTOU attacks stem from the TOCTTOU kingdom but may consequen-
tially inherit concepts from the DoS kingdom as well. In all examples of TOCTTOU that
we have illustrated, the filesystem TOCTTOU attacks, Watson’s syscall wrapper attack
and the SQL TOCTTOU, one consequence of all attacks is that the legitimate users will
not receive the expected outcome of their requests.
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The impact of DoS may vary from case to case. For example, in the case of SQL
TOCTTOU attacks, the DoS may take on greater proportions since the legitimate user’s
address will be barred from service and be considered already registered. In the case of
the filesystem TOCTTOU attack, it might be sufficient in some cases, for the legitimate
user requesting an operation on a file, to simply request the same operation again.
A general cure that may be applied through refactoring would be to wrap sensitive
parts of code between locks. Similarly, since our taxonomy provides general solutions, the
lower layers may also be treated individually. For example, in this case, the “Order” level
of the taxonomy suggests “locks” as a possible remedy which may imply mutex locks,
fractional lock permissions, database locks or transactions. Abstractly, no distinction is
made between the different types of locks because our taxonomy attempts to use con-
cepts to reason about vulnerabilities rather than programming language specifics which
is relevant only on a case-by-case basis.
On a closer inspection, all three examples of TOCTTOU attacks resemble and inherit
weaknesses from the same abstract concepts. It is only feasible to assume that the corre-
sponding solutions are similar as well. As we can see from the taxonomy tree for this type
of vulnerability, the solutions are indeed the same and differ only at code-level: filesystem,
mutex or database locks.
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Borrows concepts from both
TOCTTOU and DoS.
Non-atomic operations
and invalidated stability
conditions are the problem.
These vulnerabilities may
be fixed by using locks.
Previously reported instances
of these exploit types are
classified under these CVEs.
Kingdom
TOCTTOU DoS
Phylum
Atomicity Stability
Order
Locks
Species
CVE-2008-1570,CVE-2006-0058,
CVE-2008-2958,CVE-2004-0594,
CVE-2010-0436, CVE-2013-4169
CVE-2003-0813
Figure 6.9: The members of the species are the mentioned CVEs and they can be refined using
locking mechanisms, the theoretical concepts being atomicity and stability, all of them showing
manifestations of the concepts in the TOCTTOU or DoS Kingdom.
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CHAPTER 7
SIGNALS AND EVENTS
The “Signals and Events” category, as a leaf of “Time and State” in the abstraction
layer based taxonomy, is governed by control-flow problems with strong connections to
the confused deputy problem.
Events, which are a more modern approach to signals, suffer from the same control
flow weaknesses. Whenever an event is raised, a callback is installed in order to process
that event. In case that callback handler modifies some shared resource then it is possible
that the code within the handler may violate some stability condition on which the rest
of the program relies on.
7.0.7 Anatomy of Signal and Events Vulnerabilities
In UNIX, signals provide a simple and efficient, if rather low-level, means of interprocess
communication. Put simply, a process can cause a branch of control in another process,
causing it to run a signal handler.
When control branches to signal handler, the main code of the process may see un-
derlying state being changed by the actions of signal handlers. This situation is similar
to interference by other processes. Rely-guarantee logics make this interference explicit.
We adapt the idea of rely relations to signal handling.
At each atomic action of the server, traces of currently bound handlers are interleaved.
This makes the handlers appear atomic from the point of view of the server, but not other
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processes.
We define an idealized block-structured form of signal handling in which a signal
handler is installed at the beginning of the block and uninstalled at the end. It relates
to sigaction the way exceptions related to setjmp and atomic synchronized blocks
related to locking and unlocking.
In program logic, the rely-guarantee style of reasoning makes the interferences by other
processes between the atomic actions of the current process explicit via binary relations.
From the perspective of rely-guarantee reasoning, there are two new features having
to do with atomicity and interference: a signal handler appears atomic from the current
process, but not atomic from other processes; the rely of a process changes at different
points in the code, as different signal handlers may be installed and blocked.
We do not model the sending of signal explicitly. Rather, we reason about the be-
haviour server when receiving arbitrary signals form an arbitrary client, even a malicious
one. The safety properties of the server should be maintained.
Signals resemble exceptions in that control jumps to a handler that can be installed
by the program. Nonetheless, there are some radical differences. Whereas exception
typically abort from the context in which they were thrown rather than returning to it,
signal handlers resume control after they have run. Whereas exceptions are triggered at
specific points by the code itself, signal arrive nondeterministically.
Signal handlers can have two different control flow semantics, which we call persis-
tent and one-shot. A persistent signal can be run any number of times as long as it is
installed. By contrast, a one-shot signal handler can be run at most once, as it becomes
automatically uninstalled after being run the first time.
In the program logic, the difference between the two forms of signal handlers is reflected
in the specifications we give for them. For a persistent signal handler, we associate an
invariant I to the signal that should hold before and after the signal runs. This invariant
is similar to a loop invariant, where we also cannot statically determine how often the loop
runs. For a one-shot handler, we associate a precondition P and a postcondition Q with
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the signal. Due to the one-shot semantics, we can assume that the handler encounters P
rather than Q, which would not hold if the handler could run multiple times, as it can
for a persistent binding.
A signal handler is interleaved into its thread as a whole. The interference by the
handler as visible from that process is given by the pre- and postcondition of the handler
rather than its guarantee relation. The latter is visible as interference from the point of
view of other threads, for whom the signal handler does not run atomically.
Signals are an operating system feature, which allow a program to raise a signal which
will be scheduled for delivery by the kernel and, once delivered to a process, that process
may use a handler to perform some operations [75]. After the signal handler runs, control
flow returns to the location where the signal was initially raised. The Zalewski double
free is caused by signal handler reentry by delivering two successive signals. A sample of
the relevant involved code is given in Figure 7.1.
1 char *global_ptr;
2 void sighandler(int signal) { free(global_ptr); }
3 int main(void) {
4 signal(SIGINT, sighandler);
5 ...
6 }
Figure 7.1: Binding the signal identifier SIGINT to the signal handler sighandler.
Once a SIGINT signal is delivered, the handler sighandler runs and the memory
referenced by pointer global ptr will be freed via free(). Once the handler has executed,
and if the platform is based on an Unix implementation, the signal is rebound to the signal
handler. If a second SIGINT signal is delivered, the signal handler will run again and will
attempt to free the pointer again which will lead to a double free memory corruption.
There is nothing preventing the signal handler to run again. Up to now, the only
possible way to avoid the double free is to manually track the resources and implement
checks at every step within the signal handler when a shared resource is manipulated.
However, this can become quite tedious given more elaborate programs.
A typical variation of this vulnerability that works on both Windows and Unix plat-
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forms and is very common to system daemons is meant to send a message to the logs or
do some form of cleanup upon termination can be seen in Figure 7.2.
1 char *global_ptr;
2 void sighandler(int signal) { free(global_ptr); }
3 int main(void) {
4 signal(SIGINT, sighandler);
5 signal(SIGHUP, sighandler);
6 ...
7 }
Figure 7.2: Binding two different signal identifiers SIGINT and SIGHUP to the same signal
handler sighandler could possibly lead to executing the same function at the same time which
may further lead to data corruption if the sighandler function does not lock down the resources.
In this case, two different signals are bound to the same handler and although under
Windows, the first delivered signal, either SIGINT or SIGHUP, is automatically decoupled,
the second signal still remains bound and will still lead to a double free upon a subsequent
delivery of that signal.
Similar to the the previous example, the suggested method for fixing this type of
vulnerability is to simply not bind two different signals to the same signal handler. How-
ever, that does not necessarily imply that the second signal handler will not attempt to
deallocate the same memory region.
In Figure 7.3 we have a swimlane diagram of the Zalewski attack which illustrates the
two calls of the non re-entrant signal handler as a consequence of scheduling the delivery
of the same signal twice. In order to fix the double free memory corruption, one could
mark the signal handler as being non-persistent (Figure 7.4). The outcome is that once
a signal handler runs, the default action SIG DFL is restored for that particular signal
identifier so that the signal handler will not be called a second time.
An alternative solution would be to couple exceptions [27] with signals in order to
avoid using signal handlers for cleanup procedures. In effect, it would be the same as
adding exit after free() in the signal handler example given by Zalewski. In that case,
the rest of the operations after the memory has been freed would be discarded so that a
second pass through the signal handler will not be allowed. However, that would only be
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Figure 7.3: On the middle lane the traces t1, t3, t4 and t6 belong to a user-process. One
the left lane, the traces t2 and t5 represent the signal handler installed by the user-process. In
t1 a signal handler is installed and upon the delivery of a signal, the signal handler (t2) runs
once and returns. The attacker’s traces are illustrated on the right lane. Once the attacker
delivers another signal the signal handler (t5) runs again. The traces belonging to the handler
are different because we reason about program state which may be different upon a second call
of the signal handler.
1
2 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_ONESHOT)
3 ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
4
Figure 7.4: The linux kernel implements a programming hook which allows a signal handler
to be marked as non-persistent by adding the SA ONESHOT bit to the signal options.
applicable for daemons that use the signal handler as a means to clean and would not be
applicable to daemons such as Sendmail which dump statistics to the system log when a
certain signal is processed.
In Figure 7.5 we have a swimlane diagram where certain traces can be skipped by
using exceptions. Instead of a signal handler cleaning up the memory referenced by the
pointer, we have a catch block in trace t′2. The signal handler would throw an exception
and, instead of returning, control flow would jump over the traces t3 and t4.
The first attack following this pattern is the exploit shown by Zalewski’s “Sending
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Figure 7.5: Contrasted with Figure 7.3, exceptions are used to discard the traces t3 and t4 after
they have been used. This refinement allows us to bypass the undesired memory deallocation
in Zalewski’s signal attack by discarding the signal handler entirely using exceptions.
Signals for Fun and Profit” [89] which focuses on a vulnerability inside the Sendmail [36]
as well as the WU-FTPd [40] daemon. The second is mentioned by shaun2k2’s “Injecting
Signals for Fun and Profit” [71]. There are other signal handler exploits which are derived
from these two papers (for example, an exploit focusing on using longjmp() in Sendmail).
Similarly, vuftpd versions prior to 1.2.2 contain a signal handler that uses malloc() and
free() which makes it prone to an attack.
7.0.8 Instantiating the Predicates
We study the Sendmail (8.13.6) exploit on a lower scale by using a code-example based on
Zalewski’s paper (Figure 7.6). The interleaving occurs on three lanes between a handler,
a process and an attacker. First, some part of the heap is allocated and referenced by
the pointer ptr using malloc(). Secondly, the process performs some operations (in this
case, the process just sleeps). During this period a signal is delivered by the attacker using
kill() which schedules the execution of the processes’ handler. After the first sleep,
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the handler frees up the memory referenced by ptr using free() and then sleeps again
for another round. During the second sleep, the attacker delivers another signal which
schedules the same handler again for execution. This leads to a double free so that the
syslog() line is never reached.
Process
ptr = malloc(10);
sleep(10);
Handler
free(ptr);
Attacker
kill pid
kill pidsleep(10);
syslog(NOTICE, ptr);
Figure 7.6: Signals and event exploits commonly subscribe to a typical attack pattern. The
attacker induces some control flow decision in the target process by crossing the trust boundary.
In that sense, the process acts as a confused deputy, being manipulated by the attacker and thus
interpreting the signal delivery as a legitimate event.
We can observe that although control flow is involved, the difference between this
attack and a man-in-the-middle attack is quite subtle: the attacker does not relay any
messages between the process and the handler. Instead, it influences the process directly
by delivering a signal which has the consequence of making the process run its own
handler. In that sense, the exploit is closer to a return-to-libc attack (which is also
referred to by Zalewski’s paper) than a man-in-the-middle attack. The attack also differs
from command injection because the attacker does not feed any particular commands to
the process. Instead the process is coerced into running its own handler, choking on its
own code. Nevertheless, once the double free corruption occurs, the program is left wide
open and allowing the usual shellcode to be injected.
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7.0.9 Signal Handlers and longjmp()
Another bug in a previous Sendmail version (8.13.6) is based on signals and uses longjmp
inside a signal handler. The problem is described in CERT (SIG32-C) [13] and claims
that longjmp should not be used from inside a signal handler which may lead to undefined
behavior which is an explanation most likely based on Dijkstra’s [26] famous article on
non-local transfers.
However, the vulnerability concerning the Sendmail daemon is that a jump out of
the main event loop is made at an inappropriate time. More precisely, a buffer gets
allocated and deallocated in the main event loop. Between these two events a signal is
delivered which will diverge control flow out of the main event loop leaving the initial
buffer allocated.
Although CERT states that the problem is that by using longjmp from within a
signal handler, the GNU C library documentation [65], documents this jump out of the
main loop and is explained thoroughly in the Chapter 24.4.3 “Nonlocal Control Transfer in
Handlers”. Using longjmp from within a signal handler is not a problem in itself, however
it may be that under certain circumstances such as in the Sendmail 8.13.6 daemon, a jump
may be executed at an inappropriate time.
The solution to this problem is shown in Figure 7.5. The traces t3 and t4 from Fig-
ure 7.3 represent steps that the program skips over once the signal handler, represented
by the trace t2 is executed. The transitions made by t3 and t4 could be some deallocation
routine and the precondition for the trace t5, represented by P5 would expect that the
memory referenced by the pointer is deallocated.
The GNU C library documentation suggests that signals could be blocked by the main
event loop until it is safe to run the signal handler and that case applies here very well
since the jump should only be allowed to take place after the referenced memory has been
deallocated. Another solution would be to run the cleanup routine, within the signal
handler itself, in t2 and then execute a jump instead of leaving it up to the main event
loop to clean up in t3 and t4. Either way, the precondition P5 expects that the referenced
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memory is deallocated before t5 takes place. Alternatively, t5 could perform that cleanup
itself rather than leaving it up to the main event loop.
One particularly interesting thing to notice is that Zalewski’s paper does not mention
delivering a signal before the memory is even allocated. We can observe that the signal
is delivered (Figure 7.6) after the memory has been allocated. However, the signal may
very well be delivered before the pointer ptr is allocated using malloc which make the
handler attempt to de-allocate a pointer with no referenced memory. One could thus time
an attack to deliver a signal after a signal handler has been installed and before the global
pointers are allocated.
7.0.10 Refinement of Interrupt-Based Vulnerabilities
When dealing with “Signals and Events”, a refinement is difficult because by changing
the code one may change too much of the original behavior. For example, looking at the
Zalewski attack, we observe that if we were to disallow a second pass through the signal
handler, then the overall behavior of the program will be changed. In a concurrency con-
text that might not be feasible in case some other process placed in the same environment
would depend on the signal handler in the other program to be able to run more than
one time.
By refining a program we can thus eliminate some misbehavior due to the concurrent
interleaving of processes, however that may come at the cost of altering too much of the
original behavior such that dependent processes may break. It is difficult to distinguish
between the behavior that must be preserved and whether it clashes with the misbehavior
that must be eliminated in order to make a program safe. A good example is the TOCT-
TOU attack that we have studied previously where we have observed that locking down
the shared memory segment would prevent an attacker to overwrite the shared data. Con-
sequently, that would eliminate any possibility of interference but that would also limit
other legitimate and concurrently running processes from accessing the segment.
Closely related, a refactoring has to make sure that the same behavior has been pre-
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Inherits from Signals
and Events kingdom.
Non re-entrant code
and continuations are
the main used concepts.
These vulnerabilities may
be fixed by using jumps.
Previously reported instances
of this exploit type are
classified under these CVEs.
Kingdom
Signals and Events DoS
Phylum
Re-entrancy Continuations
Order
Jumps
Species
CVE-2003-0694,CVE-2006-0058,
CVE-2004-2259,CVE-2001-0905
CVE-2004-0794,CVE-1999-0035
CVE-2001-1349
Figure 7.7: The members of the species are the mentioned CVEs and they can be refined using
careful jumps, the theoretical concepts being re-entrancy and continuations, all of them showing
manifestations of the concepts in the “Signals and Events” Kingdom.
served after the transformation of a program. However, when it comes to security, a
refinement implicitly alters some behavior of the original program, the only condition
being that the eliminated behaviors should not affect the processes that may rely on
them.
Further work could formalize the process of eliminating behaviors from a program
while, at the same time, preserving the necessary guarantees to the environment upon
which concurrently running processes may depend on.
7.0.11 Taxonomy for Signal and Events Vulnerabilities
The problem with signals and events seems to be that not all handlers are not guaranteed
to be reentry safe. In those cases a major refinement of the handler is required. However,
if such a refinement is not feasible, one could choose to uninstall the handler after it has
run. The means to do that, would be to use jumps and skip over the code that is not
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reentry safe [87].
TOCTTOU Signals and Events
Software sql TOCTTOU,
syscall wrappers,
policyd-weight,
Sendmail, check-
install, PHP, KDE,
GDM,RPC DCOM
Sendmail, WU-FTPd,
vsftpd, procmail,
lukemftpd or tnftpd,
ftpd
CVE vulnerability ref-
erences
CVE-2008-1570,CVE-
2006-0058, CVE-2008-
2958,CVE-2004-0594,
CVE-2010-0436,
CVE-2013-4169 CVE-
2003-0813
CVE-2003-0694,CVE-
2006-0058, CVE-2004-
2259,CVE-2001-0905
CVE-2004-0794,CVE-
1999-0035 CVE-2001-
1349
General Refinement Enforcing atomicity
using some form of
locking.
Exceptions and
jumps.
Swimlanes Figure 6.1. Figure 7.3.
Taxonomy Figure 6.9. Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.8: We can represent the case-studies in a table so that the associated swimlane
diagrams depict the same attack pattern used in all the software packages mentioned in the
table.
We classify vulnerabilities (Figure 7.7) that are based on code re-entrancy issues and
which may be fixed by using continuations [74] in one category, derived from the “Signal
and Events” kingdom. On the lower layer, we have found several CVEs describing vulner-
abilities that follow the same pattern and may be found in most common UNIX system
daemons (Figure 7.8).
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CHAPTER 8
DENIAL OF SERVICE
One of the main misconceptions about denial of service attacks is that they are exclusively
tied to resource exhaustion. The predominant attack pattern of denial of service attack
is to disrupt a service through a battle of resources where one party overpowers the other
by sending more requests than the other can handle. Good examples include fork bombs,
network floods and regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) [21] which are meant to
consume as many resources as possible until a server is saturated with requests and denies
access to legitimate users.
On the other hand, coming back to TOCTTOU and Signals and Events attacks, a
side-effect is that the service is temporarily disrupted which results in am implicit DoS
for the users currently connected to the service.
The two types of attacks are different because the resource based DoS is meant to
consume resources, while the control flow DoS relies on leading a program into a state
that it either cannot handle or cannot escape. An useful tool to explain the difference
between them is to reason using automata and contrast the two types of attacks.
A regular expression DoS (ReDoS), for example, makes the generated automaton,
which is meant to process some input, increase exponentially and therefore allows an
attacker exceed a reasonable quota of memory and processing power. A good example of
ReDoS is (a+)+ For a relatively small input such as aaaa! the number of possible paths
is given by 22 or a total of 16 paths. For an input of 8 characters, such as aaaaaaaaa! the
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number of possible paths is given by 28 which means that the automaton has 256 paths to
explore. During the tests that we have performed on standard equipped machine by using
the stream editor (sed), we have found that the machine can be locked-up entirely even
by using very short strings. This leads to a quadratic blowup of the regular expression
engine that ends up expanding with the number of input characters. In practice, modern
regular expressions engines contain many additions beside the Kleene closure [57] which
make the regular expression engine even more prone to be attacked.
A very similar attack pattern is XDoS [63] which relies on creating many references in
XML files that makes the parsing of the file difficult due to the level of branching required.
A good example of an XDoS attack would be the carefully-crafted XML file in Figure 8.1.
1 <!DOCTYPE xmlbomb [
2 <!ENTITY a "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa">
3 ]>
4 <xmlbomb>&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;</xmlbomb>
Figure 8.1: A XML file using an entity a which is referenced many times within the xmlbomb
tags.
An attacker carefully crafts a XML file by defining the entity a as a long string of
characters and then refers to that entity using &a many times within the xmlbomb element.
The attacker then feeds this file to the parser that is forced to run through every reference
and thereby consumes a lot of resources senselessly. The only viable defense is to impose
limits on the depth of the paths that the parser may follow and eventually bail out if some
limit is exceeded. However, this type of limitation cannot be predicted theoretically and
may at best be calculated and scaled down to the resources dedicated to a process.
The same applies to fork bombs, an infamous one being the bash shell-bomb shown
in Figure 8.2.
1 :(){ :|:& };:
Figure 8.2: A fork-bomb written in Bash, in compact form, with the intention of spawn-
ing child-process and thus consuming resources until no other process can be spawned. The
unobfuscated version that clarifies the syntax can be seen in Figure 8.3.
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When dismantled, the code amounts to a simple recursive call which forks processes
and puts them in the background. An unwinded translation of the bash bomb, where
we substitute the semicolon character : to an explicit function name f(), is shown in
Figure 8.3.
1 f() {
2 f() | f() &
3 }
4 f()
Figure 8.3: Unobfuscated version of the Bash fork bomb from Figure 8.2 showing two recursive
function calls that fork child processes on every iteration.
This has a double effect because the input from recursive call to f() is piped into the
second process using the pipe operator |. This is partially done in order to prevent the
stub f() functions from returning, as well as increasing traffic over the pipe and hanging
the processes. During tests we have found that even on modern Linux distributions, the
bash fork-bomb manages to crash a system within seconds after it has been issued.
These types of attacks have no other purpose other than to consume resources until
they exhaust the address space and thereby new processes cannot be spawned. This can
be contrasted with control-flow DoS where an automaton is coerced into a state where no
further transitions are possible. For both cases the effect is the same because they both
lead to a denial of service for legitimate users, however, the cause for the two attacks is
different. This is why DoS appears in the taxonomy as an anomaly that is self-standing
by effect but can be related to other kingdoms by cause.
8.1 Classifying DoS using Automata
The Zalewski attack can be simplified by an automata representing transitions between
states. The state s3 in this case represents the state before the memory referenced by the
global pointer is released. The other states s1, s2, s4 and s5 represent the states of the
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s1start s2 s4 s5
s3
· · ·c1 c4 c6 c7
c2 c5
c3
Figure 8.4: The Zalewski signal hander attack illustrated in terms of automata representing a
DoS where a state cannot be revisited twice. This is the control-flow DoS and we can see that
there is no second return from s3 since the memory freed-up by the pointer has already been
de-allocated. Since the program crashes if the state s3 is revisited, then that state s3 represents
an end-state for the program.
s1start s2
s3 s4
s5 · · ·c1 c5 c6
c2
c3
c4
Figure 8.5: Another example of control-flow DoS where an automata is coerced to a branch
of states from where it cannot escape. This type of DoS is similar to the Zalewski attack, with
the exception that it does not have an end state. The program will spin around but it will not
terminate.
main program. All transitions are made by the indexed commands c. Since the program
can always return and execute the signal handler, the first transition from s2 to the signal
handler runs as expected, and the memory is freed up. However, any later return to the
signal handler from s4, s5, etc.. Will cause the signal handler to attempt and free the
same memory location (Figure 8.4).
In terms of flow control, a DoS attack that is caused by a stuck automata would be
a program that deadlocks [15] waiting to acquire a shared resource. The consequence is
that the deadlocked program is stuck and any legitimate requests sent to the program
will be ignored. This relates to the Zalewski signal handler attack due to the fact that
freeing up the memory referenced by the global pointer leads the program into a state
that should not be visited more than once. It also relates to the SQL DoS due to the fact
that once the attacker registers an address in the user’s name, the service is lead into a
state where it will refuse a new registration under the same address (Figure 8.5).
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s1start s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
· · ·c2
c3
c6
c4
c5
c7
c8
Figure 8.6: A branching automata that generates states, thereby consuming resources. This is
a good automata equivalent of resource driven DoS attacks, such as ReDoS, XDoS, fork bombs
and any type of exponential resource consumption. All of them subscribe to the same pattern
where a program is made to allocate more resources in order to satisfy requests.
This is different from a resource based DoS where the program just exhausts the
operating system’s resources. A resource based DoS, in terms of flow control, are related
to race conditions [7] where two threads spin around trying to access some resource and
end up exhausting all the processing power. In terms of automata this could be seen as
either increasing the number of transitions or states which consumes more computational
power than the underlying system would allow. This is the case for ReDoS attacks, XDoS
fork bombs and even network floods where legitimate users are attempting to access the
resources that the attacker consumes (Figure 8.6).
8.2 Taxonomy for Denial of Service
We can build a correspondence table, showing the relationships between the various types
of DoSes in order to see in which attack pattern they appear by effect or consequence.
The table in Figure 8.7 classifies the two types of DoS by showing the distinction
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Resource DoS Control Flow DoS
Appears by effect in King-
doms
Buffer Overflows, Input Val-
idation, Format Strings,
SQL Injection, etc...
Signals and Events, TOCT-
TOU
Automata Figure 8.6, Figure 8.5 Figure 8.4, Figure 8.5.
Cause Resource consumption Unexpected control-flow
branching.
Equivalent in terms of con-
currency
Race condition. Deadlock.
Prevention Limitations imposed on re-
sources.
Stability of predicates
(disallowing transitions to
states).
Consequence Denial of Service. Denial of Service and access
to compromised system.
Instances ReDoS, XDoS, Fork bombs,
Floods.
Zalewski, Watson.
Figure 8.7: We can represent the case-studies in a table so that the associated swimlane
diagrams depict the same attack pattern used in various software packages mentioned in the
table.
between DoSes that appear by effect, when the damage is consequential as well as showing
the cause that leads to the effect. It is perhaps interesting to notice that resource based
DoS is largely more predominant with more ties to other kingdoms than the control-flow
oriented DoS. However, by influencing the branching decisions within a program, acting
as a confused deputy, an attacker could achieve much more than a trivial trashing of the
system.
Concerning termination, we can make the following distinction between the three
automata for DoS shown in the figures:
1. The program illustrated by the automata in Figure 8.4 terminates, usually crashing
the program and thereby achieving a denial-of-service attack for the users that
depend on that service.
2. The program illustrated by the automata in Figure 8.5 does not terminate. It may
consume resources as it spins around, it may block the system during the spin and
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it may also be used to gain access. The DoS is observed implicitly as an effect
(consequence) or it may constitute the purpose of the attack.
3. The program illustrated by the automata in Figure 8.6 does not terminate, the DoS
is thereby consequential by staying alive and consuming resources.
It can observed that the second case is a mid-point case, where a denial of service may
constitute the whole purpose of the attack or may be used as a staging attack for an attack
meant to gain access. One extreme is given by Zalewski’s signal handler attack whose
sole purpose is to gain access, the DoS being a consequence (perhaps even undesirable for
the attacker). The other extreme is given by the resource consumption DoS attack, with
the sole purpose of making a service unavailable to others.
These distinctions grant DoS the necessary justification for being a separate kingdom.
One should note that DoS may appear subclassed to many other kingdoms (Figure 8.7),
as a consequence of an attack or as part of a staging attack. In case of a resource-based
DoS, we also find that there are no real defenses, apart from minimizing the attack surface
by imposing limits on resources. For control-flow DoS, it is frequently possible to fix a
code design flaw simply by restructuring the program and eliminating the candidate point
altogether.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
McGraw in his “Nineteen Sins Meet Seven Kingdoms” enumerates several broad categories
mostly based on bad code practice. This type of classification is difficult to manage. For
example, given McGraw’s classification, we are unsure whether the signal handler exploit
relying on longjmp() should fall into the “Time and State” category or McGraw’s “Error
Handling” since the signal exploit presented earlier for Sendmail is an instance of error
handling. However the exploit relies on manipulating global data at an inappropriate
time that would could allow us to classify the vulnerability under McGraw’s “Time and
State” kingdom. The DoS SQL attack we described in Chapter 6.0.3 could also fall both
into “Time and State” or McGraw’s “Encapsulation”. Looking at the given examples,
it becomes clear that an exploit can often be filed into several of McGraw’s categories
which makes the classification too weak. The result is that databases such as the CVE
database from the MITRE corporation or the US-CERT database exhaustively enumerate
vulnerabilities that are loosely classified under the most pronounced defect of a certain
exploit. Finally, the “The Preliminary List of Vulnerability Examples for Researchers”
(PLOVER) [18] project goes up to a list of 300 different sub-categories of attacks. Brows-
ing such listings is only possible by using MITRE’s search engine so that certain keywords
such as “TOCTTOU” or “Signals” can be picked-out. There are other related databases
such as CAPEC or CWE, both from MITRE corporation with a hierarchical structure
that is inspired from McGraw’s “Nineteen Sins Meet Seven Kingdoms” but the cate-
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gories are too shallow such that the resulting taxonomy becomes too large and difficult to
manage. For example, a certain vulnerability will appear as being subclassed to several
defects that make the real reason difficult to comprehend. One outstanding problem is
that the mentioned classifications tend to categorize the effects rather than investigating
the cause for an attack pattern or, in some cases, confusing the two. As an example,
one listed attack pattern is “Directory Traversal”, however that frequently is an effect of
improper input handling - the point being that a taxonomy built on the cause behind the
attack pattern would trim down the classification considerably. An example of a shallow
category is CAPEC’s “Functionality Misuse” that could imply a lot of attacks. Given the
vulnerabilities studied in this thesis, both the signal handler attacks and the TOCTTOU
attacks could be mis-labeled under “Functionality Misuse”.
Under these circumstances it is important to precisely find the common traits of various
vulnerabilities in order to group them together and then possibly find a solution that
may be applied to all cases which would fix most of the problems for a an entire set of
vulnerabilities. If a global solution does not apply to a particular case, one could descend
lower in the the taxonomy and up to the the code-level where fixes could be found on an
individual basis that is particular to each software package.
One common pattern that we observe is that each studied attack inherits traits from
several categories in the taxonomy. The attack that we described in Chapter 6 inherits
both the fact that the attacker races the user in order to register an address, which would
qualify the vulnerability as a TOCTTOU attack but it also results in a DoS because the
attacker registers by using the username of a legitimate user.
We conclude that TOCTTOU attacks may be grossly solved by making use of different
types of locking mechanisms. In case of filesystem redirections, one can use transactions.
For the Watson system call wrappers exploit, one can use fractional permissions to allow
reads while locking down the memory segment. For SQL TOCTTOU attacks, one can
use table locking features available for databases.
For the inappropriate interruptions caused by longjmp() in Sendmail 8.13.6 one could
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use the signal blocking features to ensure that the referenced memory is deallocated before
the rest of the program continues. One can use this technique in order to guarantee
atomicity for sensitive code thereby disallowing any concurrent interleaving for certain
critical segments of code. TOCTTOU attacks that depend on the execution of non-
atomic operations fall into this category: asynchronous functions, non-atomic flag checks
in a concurrent context and more broadly, non-atomic filesystem operations.
For signals, one may use jumps and preserve the functionality provided by the signal
handlers as described in the GNU longjmp() manual. Thus, in Sendmail 8.13.6 one could
perform the cleanup before or after the jump and still conform to the standards without
losing any portability. The studied examples converge to the same issue: some situation
arises during the execution of a program, when a certain precondition is invalidated by
a concurrent trace. A good example is a check performed on a file pointer referencing a
file. After the check, the remainder of the code works under the assumption that the file
pointer has not been coerced into pointing to some other file.
Taxonomies such as “The Preliminary List of Vulnerability Examples for Researcher” [18]
, “Pernicious Kingdoms” [78] and even the classification done by CERT are useful as an
exhaustive listing of all vulnerabilities. It would be even more useful if the taxonomy
would be built by identifying shared properties. We have summarized our conclusions for
“Time and State” attacks in Figure 7.8.
One way to express tightly related vulnerabilities would be to illustrate them using in
a tree structure where properties are inherited from upper layers and trickling down to
the lower code level. We have shown two such trees, notably the “Signals and Events”
tree (Figure 7.7) and the “TOCTTOU” (Figure 6.9) tree. The trees span from general
concepts at the top and all the way down to smaller, more distinguishing traits of each
studied software package on the lower leafs.
The resulting trees could also be used as a reference for software developers - perhaps
comparable to a risk-based assessment that would take place during the stages of software
development [59]. For example, if a developer were to know that signals will be part
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of the code, and that jumps are a typical source of errors in signal usage, then the
developer would adapt accordingly. For the TOCTTOU tree, if a developer anticipates
writing code which includes non-atomic operations, then the project could include locks
preventively. For computer scientists, when dealing with an intricate attack, it becomes
useful to visualize the abstract concepts behind a vulnerability rather than the small
details at the code level.
The conclusion is that attack patterns filed under “DoS”, “TOCTTOU” or “Signal
and Events” rely on abstract concepts that are independent of language or programming
API and should not be studied as being completely different on all layers of abstraction.
Although the attacks are different, if we study the attacks from the “Time and State”
kingdom, we can observe similarities between the attacks on layers that supersede the
actual coding of the various software packages involved.
The main purpose of a signaling mechanism is to benefit from a lightweight method
of notifying a process that an event has occurred. This applies to the Windows event-
notification system as well, with just the slight difference that Windows events are tied to
a graphical user interface rather than system daemons. However, one can observe that if
an attacker is bound to manipulate flow-control, then the same reasoning can be applied
to events. As we have seen, in most cases concerning system daemons, it is only necessary
to indicate to a process that some state has changed so that the program can take the
necessary measures and adapt.
We have examined a fair share of exploits involving signals and we believe that using
traces and rely-guarantee, one could reason about the various attacks. The signals-related
exploits constituting an important part of the taxonomy on abstraction layers seem to
follow a common attack pattern. This allows us to group program design flaws together
based on their similarities. Concerning “TOCTTOU”, if we examine the attack from a
control-flow perspective, we can observe that the interference between the attacker and
the main program occurs at the level of shared resources which could be prevented by
protecting the shared resource using locks.
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For our taxonomy, on a higher level of software engineering, we find closely related
research that uses the design-level of software components [3] in order to reason about
the outcome scenarios that each module will have leading even to automated testing for
security [2]. This is closely related to our research since composing traces together can be
seen on the lower levels as a form of snapping modules together and analyzing whether
certain transitions conform to a given specification. We complete that research by going
one step further by using rely- and guarantee and providing a specification. That way
we can pin-point exactly on the lower code-levels what transitions rely on some condition
from the environment as well as to provide some assurance to the environment. The
difference between reasoning and the design-level and traces is that we are able, albeit
tedious, to reason about highly-concurrent processes rather than looking at the level of
communication between large-scale components of software systems [60].
It is feasible to scale the taxonomy to address vulnerabilities that are not classified in
the “Time and State” kingdom. The layered approach of the taxonomy offers a systematic
vulnerability classifications that is able to hint to relationships between the various king-
doms and to highlight theoretical defects in software packages that other classifications
do not. Additionally, compared to other taxonomies where vulnerabilities are derived
from a single kingdom, the layered approach allows concepts to drift from one tree to the
other. For instance, the DoS Kingdom from Chapter 8 appears in both “TOCTTOU” and
“Signals and Events” taxonomy trees. One could address buffer overflows following the
layered taxonomy, perhaps with “Memory violation” at the level of Phylum and “Bounds
checking” at the “Order” level. The “Species” layer would thus list the numerous “Buffer
Overflow” vulnerabilities gathered by other taxonomies.
Following the classification pattern for “Time and State” vulnerabilities a taxonomy
can be built for ”Buffer Overflows” and is illustrated in Figure 9.1. One can see that DoS
is still part of the taxonomy and is still present as a consequence of the exploitation of
a service. For instance, a CVE (CVE-2011-2587) listed on MITRE explains that a heap-
based buffer overflow in the RealMedia demuxer in the VLC software package allows
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Inherits from Buffer Overflow
and DoS Kingdoms.
Memory misuse as
the main concept.
These vulnerabilities may be
fixed by using restrictions.
Previously reported instances
of this exploit type are
classified under these CVEs.
Kingdom
Buffer Overflows DoS
Phylum
Memory Misuse
Order
ACL Canaries Secure Tools
Species
CVE-1999-0003,CVE-1999-0006,
CVE-1999-0008,CVE-1999-0018,
CVE-1999-0032,CVE-1999-0034
Figure 9.1: Buffer-overflow vulnerabilities classified using the taxonomy on layers of abstrac-
tion. The DoS Kingdom is still present as a consequence. Memory misuse is the primary cause
for buffer overflows and potential solutions involve minimizing the attack surface by making
use of ACLs, canaries and other secure tools. The “Species” layer includes many instances of
reported vulnerabilities classified as CVEs by the MITRE corporation.
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a remote attacker to cause either a denial of service (application crash) or to execute
arbitrary code. Usually, the common fix for buffer overflows is to minimize the attack
surface by imposing restrictions by performing strict bounds checking, using canaries or
making use of the tools reviewed in the “Secure Languages and Tools” Chapter 2.
Further research directions could include expanding the concept of persistent and non-
persistent signal handlers. We found the one-shot binding for signals to be very useful
but it would be possible to extend the concept for other attacks. A different direction
could be to implement a way to throw an exception from a different program. A further
research direction, could include TCP-OOB [55] signals which would make the client-
server relationship of the signaling system more obvious. Traces and swimlane diagrams
are also valid in a networking context. Looking at control flow, the interleaving of traces
can be seen as network chatter between a server and a client.
In the signals case, a non-persistent signal handler would be a feasible fix for concurrent
attacks. We can not prevent the use of asynchronous unsafe functions in a concurrent
context and we can only hint that those functions are inappropriate to be used in a
concurrent context. An implementation that allows the selection of the different behaviors
(either persistent or non-persistent) offers a layer of reasoning that could prevent attacks.
It is still up to the programmer to avoid such problems and be aware of control flow
defects that may appear unexpectedly. The taxonomy on abstraction layers can only
provide some insight on typical “Time and State” attacks that have previously occurred
and thus allowed us to classify them.
By using traces and rely- and guarantee reasoning we are able to clearly specify condi-
tions under which a code segment may interact with the environment. This is a fine-grain
approach because it involves a well-defined specification that should be enforced upon
any interleaving of the program’s traces and the rest of the environment. The swimlane
diagrams allow us to keep track of processes involved in the interleaving and offers an
overview of states at any point during the execution of a program. Additionally by con-
straining the transitions with a clear specification, we can make sure that predicates and
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stability conditions are not violated for the duration of the program.
As a closing observation, security is a very broad domain, even when it is reduced
to software security. This thesis studies attacks with a very fine-grained approach and
dissects vulnerabilities into their smallest components. Since the intended audience is
composed of security specialists, as well as theoreticians, it is important to highlight the
fact that this level of analysis is often far superior and addresses issues on a level that
may be distant to what one would encounter in a real case scenario. That means to imply
that in a real case scenario, attacks take place at the level of quantity rather than at the
level of quality. For example, by scanning address blocks and systematically looking for
vulnerable systems. This ranges from lower-level template-based bots or crawlers that
scan for opportunities, by analyzing program behavior, and by mass-probing systems.
Regarding the security of servers, it may be often the case that an attack can be avoided
by simply not leaking information about services. For example, it is often a system
administrator’s trick to change the standard access ports to services in order to minimize
the attack surface. Not only does that close avenues for a potential attack, but that may
also reduce the network traffic generated by attacks.
This does not advocate the notion of being obscure, in order to increase security, but it
proves to be an effective measure for thwarting off arbitrary attacks. Similarly, this does
not imply that elaborate attacks do not exist (in fact, they are a component of automated
attacks) but that it is statistically rare that an adversary would stage an elaborate attack
targeted at a particular system.
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